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LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS

Kirsten Matoy Carlson*
Abstract: Congress and Native Nations have renegotiated the federal-tribal relationship in
the past fifty years. The courts, however, have failed to keep up with Congress and recognize
this modern federal-tribal relationship. As a result, scholars, judges, and practitioners often
characterize federal Indian law as incoherent and inconsistent. This Article argues that the
Restatement of the Law of American Indians retells federal Indian law to close the gap between
statutory and decisional law. It realigns federal Indian law with the modern federal-tribal
relationship negotiated between Congress and tribal governments. Consistent with almost a
half-century of congressional law and policy, the Restatement clarifies the foundational
principles of federal Indian law and provides federal and state courts with guidance on how to
interpret statutes related to Native governments and peoples. It provides courts with a vision
of federal Indian law that is more coherent, easier to apply, and more reflective of the state of
affairs in Indian Country than the decisional law adopted by the Supreme Court in the past fifty
years.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal Indian law underwent a fundamental and dramatic change fifty
years ago. Prior to 1970, policymakers had privileged non-Indian voices
in the development of federal Indian law for decades to devastating
effect.1 In the late 1960s, Executive Branch officials and members of
Congress started listening to tribal governments and American Indian and
Alaska Native organizations when making laws impacting Indians and
Indian governments.2 The result was a complete reversal of federal Indian
law and policy.3 President Nixon and then Congress repudiated the
Termination Policy, meant to disestablish tribal governments and
assimilate tribal citizens, and adopted the Tribal Self-Determination
Policy, which promotes tribal sovereignty by transferring control over
federal programs to tribal governments.4 In adopting the Tribal SelfDetermination Policy, Congress returned to the foundational principles of

1. EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS 77–79
(1989). E. Fletcher McClellan, The Politics of American Indian Self-Determination, 1958–75: The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 22 (Dec. 1988) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Tennessee) (on file with author).
2. McClellan, supra note 1, at 104–11. See GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, TO SHOW HEART: NATIVE
AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1960–1975 12 (1998) (discussing
how President Kennedy’s Commission of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash consulted with and listened to
tribal governments); GROSS, supra note 1, at 79.
3. GROSS, supra note 1, at xvi.
4. See infra section I.A.
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federal Indian law.5 It embarked on a renegotiation of its ongoing
relationship with Native Nations.6 These efforts have led to a modern
federal-tribal relationship that acknowledges the sovereign governmental
status of Native Nations and the federal government’s duty to protect
them.
Many court decisions, however, have not lived up to these changes.
Rather, led by the Supreme Court, federal and state courts have frequently
diverged from congressional Indian policy and foundational principles of
federal Indian law, including their own past precedents.7 They have
ignored the modern federal-tribal relationship forged by tribal
governments and Congress over the past five decades and the lived
experiences of Native peoples more generally.8 As a result, federal Indian
law has proceeded along two seemingly separate tracks as Congress has
continued to affirm and extend tribal sovereignty and participation in
lawmaking while the courts often undercut it.9 This divergence has led to
fifty years of inconsistent and incoherent decision making by courts that
has left federal Indian law in disarray and far more complicated than it
needs to be.10
In this Article, I argue that the Restatement of the Law of American
Indians retells federal Indian law in a way that allows for the reuniting of
these two strains of federal Indian law. The Restatement departs from
many commentaries on federal Indian law, which focus on decisional
law,11 by framing federal Indian law as statutory law.12 It views federal
Indian law through the lens of how Congress and Indians have remade the
federal-tribal relationship and substantive law over the past fifty years.13
In short, it brings two major players in the creation of federal Indian law—
Congress and tribal governments—back into the picture and reiterates for

5. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(a).
6. Since its formation, the United States has established legal relationships with American Indians
as separate political communities. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal
Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1123, 1125–26 (1994). This
relationship is often referred to as the federal-tribal relationship.
7. See infra section I.B.
8. See infra section I.B.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra section I.B.
11. Vine Deloria, Jr., The Wisdom of Congress and Other Folklore, 23 OKLA CITY U. L. REV. 261,
271–72 (1998) (“Not only has legal scholarship abandoned or avoided any real examination of
Congress in formulating Indian legislation, but most legal scholars working in the field of Indian
affairs have virtually no familiarity with the materials.”); see also infra section I.B.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
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courts the central role that they play in making federal Indian law.14 It then
directs courts to follow Congress’s lead and act consistently with
congressional policy and foundational principles of federal Indian law.15
In Part I, I recount how federal Indian law has developed along two
separate lines over the past fifty years. Section I.A relies on my previous
research to show that since the 1970s, Congress has responded to
increased tribal advocacy by adopting a largely consistent policy based on
foundational principles of federal Indian law.16 Scholars have identified
the foundational principles of federal Indian law as:
• Tribes are governments with inherent sovereign powers, not
delegated or granted by the United States;
• The U.S. Constitution gives Congress full control over Indian
affairs—including authority to limit tribal powers;
• The federal government holds responsibilities to Indian tribes
and individual Indians known as the trust relationship;
• Indian Nations retain powers unless Congress has expressed
clear and plain intent to abrogate them; and
• State governments have no authority to regulate Indian affairs
absent express Congressional delegation or grant.17
In the past five decades, Congress has renewed its relationship with
Native Nations and substantively changed federal Indian law to recognize
these foundational principles.18 Through a network of statutes, Congress
has strengthened the inherent governmental authority possessed by tribal
governments and the trust relationship between tribal and federal
governments.19 It has also acknowledged its own limited powers to

14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra section I.A.
17. Scholars vary in their exact framing of these foundational principles. See FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of
Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 28, 28 (2005); David H. Getches, Beyond
Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream
Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 269–73 (2001); RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS
ch. 1, intro. note (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2021).
Almost all scholars rely on the list devised by Felix Cohen in his attempt to summarize federal
Indian law cases and statutes for the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1941. COHEN’S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122–23 (1941). Some add federally protected lands for designated Indian
tribes to the list. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 6; Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Making Strategic Choices:
How and Why Indian Groups Advocated for Federal Recognition from 1977 to 2012, 51 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 930, 932 (2017). Others emphasize tribal governments’ loss of external autonomy. See Skibine,
supra note 17.
18. See infra section I.A.
19. See infra section I.A.
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abrogate tribal authority.
This shift has been procedural as well as substantive. Congress has
sought to maximize Indian participation in the legislative process leading
to a lawmaking process inclusive of Native peoples.20 The era of Congress
and the Executive Branch making laws for Native peoples without Native
input has ended. It has been replaced with a process aimed at making laws
with Native peoples.21 The inclusion of Native peoples in the lawmaking
process has contributed to the substantial changes already mentioned,
namely the development of a body of federal statutory law and policy that
fosters the foundational principles of federal Indian law.22
Section I.B shows that the courts have not kept up with this shift in
federal Indian law.23 In contrast, court decisions have departed from the
foundational principles of federal Indian law, congressional policy, and
their own past precedents.24 They have sought to replace Congress as the
primary maker of federal Indian law, limited the impact of laws enacted
by Congress to further tribal sovereignty, continued to rely on laws
repudiated by Congress, and ignored the canons of statutory
construction.25 Some recent Supreme Court opinions can be interpreted as
seeking to realign the Court with foundational principles and
congressional policy,26 but fifty years of inconsistent and incoherent
decision making by federal and state courts have left court-made federal
Indian law in disarray and far more complicated than it needs to be.
Part II argues that the Restatement of American Indian Law reframes
federal Indian law so that it reflects the modern federal-tribal relationship
20. See infra section I.A.
21. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and
Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 205 (1989).
22. See infra section I.A.
23. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121
(2006).
24. See infra section I.B.
25. See infra Part I.
26. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016) (holding that Congress had never diminished
the Omaha reservation); McGirt v. Oklahoma, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (upholding the
treaty that created the Muskogee Nation’s reservation and finding that Congress had never abrogated
it). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 963, 965 (2022)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 111, 112 (2020) [hereinafter Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze]; Ann E. Tweedy, Has Federal
Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail of Tears”?, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 739, 739
(2021).
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have expressly departed from foundational principles of
federal Indian law and congressional policy, rewriting the Constitution, and ignoring its own
precedents. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022) (holding that
the state of Oklahoma has concurrent criminal jurisdiction over crimes against Indians in Indian
Country). For a discussion of scholars’ criticism of Castro-Huerta, see infra section I.B.
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negotiated by tribal governments and Congress over the past fifty years.
The modern federal-tribal relationship emphasizes the negotiation of
federal Indian law by tribal governments and Congress, recognizes tribal
sovereignty, and implements the federal trust relationship with tribal
governments and individual Indians.27 The federal statutory law and
policy enacted as a result of this relationship adheres to foundational
principles of federal Indian law.28 The Restatement retells federal Indian
law to promote this modern relationship, to reaffirm foundational
principles of federal Indian law, and to align the law with congressional
policy.29 The result is a vision of federal Indian law that is more coherent,
easier to apply, and more reflective of the state of affairs in Indian
Country.
The Restatement then instructs courts to follow this vision of federal
Indian law. Consistent with other American Law Institute Restatements,
the Restatement of the Law of American Indians is “primarily addressed
to courts and aim[s] at clear formulations of common law and its statutory
elements, and reflect[s] the law as it presently stands or might
appropriately be stated by a court.”30 As a directive to courts, it seeks to
resolve the tensions between statutory and decisional law that currently
exist in federal Indian law. The Restatement instructs courts to act
consistently with the modern federal-tribal relationship by applying
foundational principles of federal Indian law and congressional policy.
I.

THE DIVERGENT PATHS OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

This Part describes how federal Indian law has developed along two
separate lines over the past fifty years. Section I.A demonstrates how
starting in the 1970s, Congress and Native Nations negotiated a modern
federal-tribal relationship, largely in response to Indian advocacy.
Congress remade federal Indian law and its relationship with tribal
governments by returning to its foundational principles and adopting the
Tribal Self-Determination Policy.31 Through advocacy, Native peoples
shifted their relationship with Congress and gained a more prominent role
in making federal Indian law and policy.32 Together Congress and tribal
governments developed a modern federal-tribal relationship based on
27. See infra section I.A.
28. See infra section I.A.
29. See infra Part II.
30. Frequently Asked Questions, AM. L. INST., http://ali.org/about-ali/faq/ [https://perma.cc/3SPE8MJG].
31. See infra section I.A.
32. See infra section I.A.
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tribal participation in federal lawmaking that both recognizes tribes are
governments with inherent sovereign powers and acknowledges that the
federal government holds responsibilities to tribes through the trust
relationship.33 Over time this modern federal-tribal relationship has led
Congress to enact statutes that realign federal Indian law with its
foundational principles. Section I.B shows how federal courts
increasingly created their own version of federal Indian law by departing
from foundational principles and congressional policy.
A.

Renegotiating the Federal-Tribal Relationship and Remaking
Federal Indian Law: Indian Advocacy and Congress

Native governments and peoples have continually attempted to
influence non-Indigenous governments to craft policies that recognize and
protect their tribal sovereignty. During the nineteenth century, Indian
Nations used the treaty-making process to retain their existing
governmental and property rights.34 They also petitioned and sent
delegates to Washington, D.C., to meet with members of the Executive
Branch and Congress.35 Native Nations continued to petition and send
delegations to Washington, D.C., after Congress unilaterally terminated
treaty-making in 1871.36
Indian involvement in federal policymaking ebbed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as members of Congress and the
Executive Branch privileged the views of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) and other non-Indians in crafting Indian policy.37 Indian Nations
continued their advocacy despite their lack of political influence. They
33. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 982 (noting the emergence of a new federaltribal relationship and referring to it as the “trust relationship”).
34. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at 26; INDIAN L. RES. CTR.,
NATIVE LAND LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL
RESOURCES 123 (lawyers ed. 2012). For example, Anishinaabek nations in present day Wisconsin
and Minnesota negotiated the retention of their hunting, gathering, and fishing rights even when they
ceded lands to the United States government. Treaty with the Chippewas, 7 Stat. 536, 537 (1837); see
also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
35. FREDRICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS AND THE AFTER
PLACE THEY MADE 70–71 (2013) (documenting Choctaw delegations to Washington, D.C. in the
1820s); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN POLITICS 40
(2000); Daniel Carpenter, On the Emergence of the Administrative Petition: Innovations in
Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT:
ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 349, 351–52, 354–56 (Nicholas R. Parrillo
ed., 2017).
36. HERMAN VIOLA, DIPLOMATS IN BUCKSKINS: A HISTORY OF INDIAN DELEGATIONS IN
WASHINGTON CITY 190–99 (1995). For a discussion of how the United States continued to negotiate
with Indian tribes after the end of treatymaking, see Deloria, supra note 21, at 210.
37. GROSS, supra note 1, at 77, 79; McClellan, supra note 1, at 22, 50–53.
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faced tremendous obstacles and were unable to prevent Congress from
enacting some policies extremely detrimental to tribal sovereignty,
including allotment and termination.38 Even in those bleak times, some
Indian Nations persuaded Congress to enact legislation beneficial to them
over tremendous opposition.39 Other tribal governments somehow
managed to resist and prevent the passage of legislation terminating their
tribal existence or subjecting them to state jurisdiction.40
Tribal governments and organizations mobilized against the
Termination Policy, which sought to end the federal government’s
recognition of Indian tribes as governments,41 and mounted a major
campaign against the policy’s expansion.42 The Indian lobby, however,
remained weak as Indian Nations had limited financial resources and little
experience in federal policymaking.43 Historically, tribal governments had
approached Congress to resolve tribe specific issues,44 but significant
changes were on the horizon.
In the 1950s and 1960s, with the resurgence in Indian identity and the
development of pan-tribal organizations, tribal governments started to
combine their advocacy efforts and shift their focus to national level

38. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 66 (2005)
[hereinafter WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE].
The Allotment Policy undermined Indian Nations by dividing up and allotting tribally held land
into alienable fee simple properties held by individual Indians and assimilating Indians into
mainstream American culture as farmers. Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
The Termination Policy sought to assimilate Indians into mainstream American society by ending
a tribal government’s relationship with the federal government, liquidating tribal assets, and
dissolving the trust status of tribal lands. Termination Act of 1953, H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong.,
67 Stat. 132 (1953).
For a general discussion of these policies, see generally DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, & KRISTEN A. CARPENTER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (7th ed. 2016).
39. For example, Congress returned Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo in 1972. WILKINSON, BLOOD
STRUGGLE, supra note 38, at 210–17.
40. For example, Indian advocacy prevented the termination of the Flathead reservation in 1954
and the Sioux defeated efforts to extend Public Law 208 to them in 1964. WILKINSON, BLOOD
STRUGGLE, supra note 38, at 123–25.
41. Termination Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 132 (1953).
42. THOMAS W. COWGER, THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FOUNDING
YEARS 3 (1999); McClellan, supra note 1, at 49, 57–58.
43. The BIA denied tribes the ability to use their own trust funds to finance lobbying visits to
Washington well into the late 1940s. CASTILE, supra note 2, at xxv. Castile describes the Indian lobby
in the 1960s as making modest legislative proposals and not having much clout among members of
Congress. Id. at 19.
44. Tribal petitions to policymakers and delegations to Washington, D.C., are well documented.
VIOLA, supra note 36, at 22–41.
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issues.45 As a result, pan-tribal organizations, led by the National
Congress of the American Indian (NCAI), started taking Native concerns
directly to Congress in the 1950s and 1960s.46
As my previous research has documented in more detail, tribal
advocacy and a receptive White House precipitated a major shift in federal
Indian law and policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s.47 Pressure from
tribal governments, the NCAI, and the Red Power movement encouraged
the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to repudiate the Termination
Policy.48 President Nixon embraced the self-determination approach in his
1968 presidential campaign and his support stimulated the adoption of this
approach as federal Indian policy.49 By 1970, President Nixon had
publicly repudiated the anti-Indian policies of the 1950s and replaced
them with the Tribal Self-Determination Policy.50 Congress lagged behind
the President but eventually embraced the new policy of Tribal SelfDetermination.51
In 1975, Congress formally adopted the policy in the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).52 Commonly
referred to as the Tribal Self-Determination Policy, this policy committed
the United States “to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the
development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of
administering quality programs and developing the economies of their
respective communities.”53 A cornerstone of the policy, the ISDEAA was
45. See Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1463, 1472–73 (2011).
46. COWGER, supra note 42, at 108–25 (describing a shift in NCAI policy to fighting termination).
See Stephen Cornell, The New Indian Politics, 10 WILSON Q. 113, 117–20, 194–95 (1986).
47. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 HARV. J. LEGIS. 23, 56–60 (2019).
48. McClellan, supra note 1, at 129–49. The rise of American Indian activism in the late 1960s and
early 1970s is commonly referred to as the Red Power movement. See generally STEPHEN CORNELL,
THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988); JOANE NAGEL,
AMERICAN INDIAN ETHIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CULTURE
(1996); WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE, supra note 38, at 129. American Indian activists protested
KKK rallies in the South, exercised their fishing and hunting rights in the Midwest and Northwest,
occupied Alcatraz and Wounded Knee, and caravanned to Washington, D.C. McClellan, supra note
1, at 129–49; ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
181–90 (2014). Scholars often differentiate this activism from the Civil Rights Movement, which
sought political and social inclusion, rather than recognition of tribal sovereignty. WILKINSON,
BLOOD STRUGGLE, supra note 38, at 129; VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN
INDIAN MANIFESTO 168–96 (1970).
49. Carlson, supra note 47, at 58.
50. GROSS, supra note 1, at 34–38. According to Gross, Nixon attributed his positive stance towards
American Indians to the influence of his college football coach. Id. at 70–71.
51. Carlson, supra note 47, at 58.
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423.
53. Id. § 5302(b).

Carlson (Do Not Delete)

734

10/25/22 9:10 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:725

to build tribal institutional capacities and economies by transferring
control over federal programs to tribal governments.54 It required the
Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human Services to contract with
tribal organizations to operate federal programs for Indians upon the
request of any Indian tribe.55
The adoption of the Tribal Self-Determination Policy signaled a
dramatic shift in the federal government’s position on federal Indian law
and policy.56 For the first time since the 1930s, Congress returned to
foundational principles of federal Indian law.57 Consistent with these
principles, it promulgated a policy that supported Indian Nations as
governments with inherent sovereign powers, not delegated or granted by
the United States, and separate from the states; recognized federal
responsibilities to Indian tribes through the trust relationship; and invited
tribal governmental participation in federal policymaking.58 Under the
ISDEAA, money flowed directly to tribal governments, bypassing the
BIA and the states, and enabling Indian Nations to make important
decisions regarding their welfare.59 Many tribal governments, which had
begun to administer programs under the Office of Economic Opportunity,
embraced the ISDEAA and complained about the BIA’s reluctance in
implementing it.60
Despite some initial resistance, the new perspective on Indian affairs
embodied in the Tribal Self-Determination Policy “eventually came to

54. GROSS, supra note 1, at 20–21.
55. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 779
(2006).
56. GROSS, supra note 1, at xvi.
57. The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) enacted in 1934 recognized tribal sovereignty, ended
allotment, and created opportunities for tribes to form and operate as tribal governments. DAVID
TREUER, THE HEARTBEAT OF WOUNDED KNEE: NATIVE AMERICA FROM 1890 TO THE PRESENT 206–
09 (2019). Congress has never repealed the IRA. Some scholars see the Tribal Self-Determination
Policy as a continuation of the IRA. See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm
Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1814 (2019) (linking the collaborative government-togovernment relationship envisioned by the IRA to modern laws supporting self-determination).
58. See CASTILE, supra note 2, at 168–70. Gross documents that policymakers in the 1970s “agreed
that self-determination meant self-government for Indian tribes.” GROSS, supra note 1, at 31 (“Thus,
for policymakers involved with Indian affairs during the 1970s, self-determination was the belief that
Indian tribes and communities could become economically and politically autonomous by applying
their powers of self-government to the pursuit of economic development and self-sufficiency.”).
59. Carlson, supra note 47, at 60.
60. E. Fletcher McClellan, Implementation and Policy Reformulation of Title 1 of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975-80, 6 WICAZO SA REV. 45, 50 (1990). Other
tribal governments feared that self-determination was termination by another name. For example, the
name of the 1972 NCAI Conference was “Self-Determination or Disguised Termination.” Series 1:
NCAI Conventions and Mid-year Conferences, 1944–1989, Box 21 1972, in RECS. OF THE NAT’L
CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, 1933–1990 (2015).
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pervade [Congress’s] entire approach to Indian affairs.”61 Throughout the
rest of the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress enacted several key bills
expanding and enhancing the Tribal Self-Determination Policy.62 This
legislation institutionalized the policy and reinforced the growing capacity
of Indian Nations as governments exercising their own authority.63
The enactment of the ISDEAA in 1975 also served as a turning point
in the federal-tribal relationship as American Indian and Alaska Native
Nations and organizations used legislative advocacy to reclaim their role
in the federal lawmaking process.64 Policymakers were finally ready to
put the Indian back in Indian law. The ISDEAA reiterates the importance
of a tribal role and recognizes:
[T]he obligation of the United States to respond to the strong
expression of the Indian people for self-determination by assuring
maximum Indian participation in the direction of educational as
well as other Federal services to Indian communities so as to
render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of
those communities.65
My previous research documents tribal governments’ increasing
engagement in the legislative process.66 It tracks the dramatic growth in
reported lobbying by Indian Nations and organizations, starting in the late
1970s.67 It demonstrates how tribal governments and organizations have
emerged as central players in the federal lawmaking process, often
shaping legislation related to them.68
61. GROSS, supra note 1, at 78. See also Fletcher, supra note 23, at 143 (“[C]ongressional support
of tribal self-governance is unwavering”).
62. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1603, 2501–2511, 5301–5423, 3601–3631, 1901–1963; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996.
63. The Tribal Self-Determination Policy may have also stimulated American Indian legislative
advocacy by helping some Indian nations build their internal capacities to deliver programs and
services to their citizens. The stakes Indian nations had in the implementation of these programs
and services increased as they gained direct managerial control over them. Tribes, thus, had more
incentives both in protecting these programs and in advocating for improvements in them.
Moreover, as their internal capacities grew, Indian tribes gained expertise in these areas, making
them more knowledgeable about the programs that work in their communities and more able to
advocate effectively to policymakers.
Carlson, supra note 47, at 56; see GROSS, supra note 1, at 108–09.
64. Carlson, supra note 47, at 56–60.
65. 25 U.S.C. § 5302(a).
66. Carlson, supra note 47, at 39–40.
67. Id. at 40 (documenting an almost 700% increase in reported lobbying by Indian nations from
1978 to 2012).
68. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, 2018 BYU L. REV. 1159,
1177–220 (2018) [hereinafter Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy] (documenting how tribal governments
have influenced federal legislation to protect and/or extend tribal sovereignty); Kirsten Matoy
Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation: American Indian Opposition to Federal Legislation, 7
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Congress has promoted maximum Indian participation and
increasingly renegotiated the federal-tribal relationship to reflect its duty
of protection to tribal governments.69 Shortly after enacting the ISDEAA,
Congress created the American Indian Policy Review Commission
(AIPRC), which was charged with conducting a “two-year study that was
intended to lead to recommendations for broad changes in federal Indian
policies.”70 The AIPRC sought to hear directly from Native people all
across Indian Country.71 Through the AIPRC process, the Senate
recognized the value in the political, government-to-government
relationship it has with tribal governments and their input in the political
process.72 To institutionalize tribal participation, it established the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs (SCIA).73 The SCIA provided access to
Congress and new opportunities for American Indians to engage in
legislative strategies.74 Members of Congress, especially the chairs of the
SCIA and the House Committee on Natural Resources, have also
increasingly hired tribal citizens as staffers.75 These staffers have
regularly reached out to and consulted with tribal governments and
organizations on major pieces of legislation relating to American Indians
and Alaska Natives.76 In combination, the increase in tribal legislative
advocacy, institutionalization of the SCIA, and the outreach to tribal
governments by congressional staffers has transformed the federal-tribal
relationship, returning it to a dynamic more akin to the negotiation and
J. RACE, ETHNICITY, & POL. 65, 74–82 (2022) [hereinafter Carlson, Beyond Descriptive
Representation] (showing how unified tribal opposition undermines the enactment of federal
legislation and encourages its amendment).
69. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 973 (describing Congress as prioritizing
bottom-up thinking and “giving tribes room to propose, adopt, and implement solutions” since the
1970s); Blackhawk, supra note 57, at 1814, 1838.
70. ALAN R. PARKER, PATHWAYS TO INDIGENOUS NATION SOVEREIGNTY: A CHRONICLE OF
FEDERAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 14–15 (Gordon Henry ed., 2018).
71. Id. at 16. In setting up the Commission, Senator Abourezk sought to hire as many Native people
as possible and let them be in charge of the investigation. Id. at 15. Parker describes this as both
revolutionary and effective. Id.
72. Id. at 14–25, 123–24.
73. Id. at 21 (noting that the most important contribution made by the AIPRC was the creation of
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs); id. at 31–37 (describing the creation of the Committee).
74. For a discussion of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and how it contributed to tribal
participation in legislative lawmaking, see Carlson, supra note 47, at 61–63.
75. GROSS, supra note 1, at 79, 86; PARKER, supra note 70, at 34–35. Some of these staffers have
included, inter alia: Forrest Gerard (Blackfeet tribal citizen), Patricia Zell (Navajo), Alan Parker
(Chippewa Cree Tribal Nation citizen), Frank Ducheneaux (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal citizen),
Alex Skibine (Osage Nation citizen), and Tadd Johnson (Fort Boise Chippewa tribal citizen). More
recently, tribal citizens have served in the offices of individual members of Congress.
76. GROSS, supra note 1, at 86; PARKER supra note 70, at xii, 59–60, 85–90; Carlson, supra note
47, at 75.
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diplomacy that originally informed treaty making between the two
sovereigns.77
Tribal advocacy and active participation in the federal legislative
process have encouraged Congress to remake federal Indian law over the
past five decades based on foundational principles of federal Indian law.78
In response to tribal advocacy, Congress has reiterated its commitment to
recognizing tribal governments as having their own authority by
amending the ISDEAA several times since 1975.79 Congress has
promoted tribal authority by resolving issues arising in the ISDEAA’s
implementation. Congress has expanded contracting to new programs and
increased tribal control over program design.80 For example, the Indian
Self-Determination Amendments of 1988 responded to tribal concerns by
improving many aspects of the contracting process, including clarifying
contract funding levels.81
Congress further acknowledged tribal sovereignty in the 1988
Amendments to the ISDEAA by creating a self-governance demonstration
program that allowed tribal governments more flexibility in administering
Department of the Interior (DOI) and Indian Health Service (IHS)
programs through the creation of self-governance compacts.82 Selfgovernance compacting provides tribes with input in the design and
allocation of funding among the different programs. Tribes negotiate a
single annual funding agreement, which sets the terms for the
administration of all programs for tribes or Indians administered by the
DOI or the IHS.83 Tribal governments may reallocate funds among
77. Deloria, supra note 21, at 205, 217 (“Building upon the idea that they were dealing with a quasisovereign nation, Congress and the executive branch since 1970 have moved toward negotiations as
a means of resolving disputes with Indians.”).
78. As my research has repeatedly demonstrated, tribal advocacy has substantively changed federal
legislation. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy, supra note 68, at 1159–2018 (demonstrating how tribal
advocacy has influenced federal legislation that benefits tribal governments); Carlson, supra note 47,
at 74–82 (showing how tribal governments and organizations use legislative advocacy to block and/or
amend legislation harmful to them).
79. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy, supra note 68, at 1199–219; Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen
D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance under the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 29–48 (2014); Tadd M.
Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1266–69 (1995).
80. For an in-depth discussion of the amendments to the ISDEAA, see Strommer & Osborne, supra
note 79, at 29–48.
81. Id. at 30.
82. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.) (referring to
self-governance compacts as “self-determination contracts”).
83. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at 1389–90. Slightly different
provisions govern compacting with each agency. Id. at 1390.
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programs and may redesign or consolidate programs.84 Congress made the
self-governance program permanent for the DOI in 199485 and for the IHS
in 2000.86
The Tribal Self-Determination Policy, however, has come to
encompass more than the ISDEAA. The modern federal-tribal
relationship has prompted Congress to enact several other major pieces of
legislation, which reinforce its commitment to treating Indian tribes as
governments, building their institutions and economies, and
implementing the trust relationship.87 For example, Congress has
recognized the importance of tribal self-determination in the delivery of
healthcare through the Indian Healthcare Improvement Act of 1976;88
ensured tribal control over the placement of Indian children in the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978;89 treated tribal governments like other
governments for tax purposes in the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status
Act of 1982;90 and fostered the development of tribal legal systems in the
Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993,91 the Indian Tribal Justice Technical
and Legal Assistance Act of 2000,92 and the Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010.93 Consistent with foundational principles of federal Indian law,
these statutes acknowledge that tribes are governments with inherent
sovereign powers.
In addition to elevating the foundational principles of tribal
sovereignty, Congress has strengthened the importance of the trust
relationship as a foundational principle of federal Indian law. Congress
has enacted numerous statutes based on and enforcing the trust
relationship, including, inter alia: the National Indian Forest Resources
84. Id.
85. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5368).
86. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5399).
87. Wilkins and Stark list 23 bills enacted between 1975 and 2010 as major congressional law
affecting Indians. DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI K. STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 267–69 (3d ed. 2011). Castile identifies several additional statutes
that implement the Self-Determination Policy. See CASTILE, supra note 2, at 30, 90–92.
88. Indian Healthcare Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1603.
89. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963).
90. Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7871).
91. Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631).
92. Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114
Stat. 2778 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651–3682).
93. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258.
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Management Act,94 which recognizes the trust responsibility of the United
States toward Indian forest lands; the American Indian Agricultural
Resource Management Act,95 which acknowledges the United States trust
responsibility toward Indian trust lands and natural resources; the
American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act,96 which reforms
trust management policies and their implementation by the Secretary of
the Interior and Bureau of Land Management; the Native American
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act,97 which recognizes a
trust responsibility for the protection and preservation of tribes, including
to provide adequate housing for tribal citizens; the Indian Child Welfare
Act,98 which recognizes the protection of Indian children as part of the
federal trust responsibility; and the Tribal Self-Governance Act,99 which
acknowledges the federal trust responsibility to tribes and individual
Indians. In these and other statutes, Congress has also recognized a
general duty to protect and provide for American Indians (sometimes
referred to as a general trust relationship). These statutes include, inter
alia: No Child Left Behind;100 the Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act;101 the Tribally Controlled Schools Act;102
the Tribal Law and Order Act;103 and the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act.104
Further evidence of Congress’s return to foundational principles of
federal Indian law emerges in the reluctance with which Congress enacts
legislation that limits tribal authority. Under foundational principles of
federal Indian law, Congress retains plenary power, including the power
to limit tribal authority.105 Congress, however, has increasingly chosen not
94. 25 U.S.C. § 3120.
95. Id. § 3742.
96. Id. § 4041.
97. Id. § 4101.
98. Id. § 1901.
99. Id. § 5366.
100. 20 U.S.C. § 7401 (“It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the Federal Government’s
unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education
of Indian children.”).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2401(1)–(2) (acknowledging that the trust responsibility includes an obligation to
assist tribes in meeting the health and social needs of their members).
102. Id. § 2501(b) (declaring Congress’s commitment to fulfilling the federal trust responsibility
to Indian people for the education of their children).
103. Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a), 124 Stat. 2258, 2262–63 (2010)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2815) (finding that Congress has trust obligations to
provide for the public safety of Indian Country).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (1990) (recognizing the general trust relationship between tribes and the
federal government).
105. See supra Part I.
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to diminish tribal authority.106 Congress has not terminated a single tribal
government in the past fifty years. Nor has Congress enacted any pantribal bills proposing to strip tribal governments of jurisdiction or
sovereign immunity.107 Some members of Congress continue to introduce
these bills, but Congress does not hold hearings on the majority of
proposed bills that include provisions that would strip tribal jurisdiction
or limit tribal authority.108
106. Some scholars doubt whether Congress has ever truly been in a position to exercise unlimited
powers over tribal governments. Deloria, supra note 21, at 210.
107. See, e.g., Native Americans Equal Opportunity Act, H.R. 13329, 95th Cong. (1978)
(abrogating Indian treaties, breaking up communal assets, and terminating special services guaranteed
to Indians); Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1982, H.R. 5494, 97th Cong. (1982)
(extinguishing Indians claims to lands and/or natural resources within the States of New York and
South Carolina); H.R. 3034, 100th Cong. (1987) (abrogating off-reservation, usufructuary rights of
Indian tribes to hunt, fish, and gather in the State of Wisconsin); Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments
of 1998, S. 2747, 100th Cong. (1988) (granting jurisdiction over Indian Civil Rights Act claims to
federal courts and waiving tribal sovereign immunity); H.R. 2058, 101st Cong. (1989) (abrogating
off-reservation, usufructuary rights of Indian tribes to hunt, fish, and gather in the State of Wisconsin);
H.R. 1448, 104th Cong. (1995) (amending the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 to require that
determinations regarding status as an Indian child and as a member of an Indian tribe be prospective
from the date of birth of the child and of tribal membership of the member, and for other purposes);
Indian Civil Rights Enforcement Act, S. 2298, 105th Cong. (1998) (granting jurisdiction over Indian
Civil Rights Act claims to federal courts and waiving tribal sovereign immunity); American Indian
Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998) (extending federal and state jurisdiction over specified
civil claims in Indian Country); Tribal Environmental Accountability Act, S. 2301, 105th Cong.
(1998) (waiving tribal sovereign immunity); American Indian Contract Enforcement Act, S. 2299,
105th Cong. (1998) (giving federal courts jurisdiction over tribal claims and waiving tribal sovereign
immunity); American Indian Tort Liability Insurance Act, S. 2302, 105th Cong. (1998) (giving
federal courts jurisdiction over tort claims against tribes and waiving tribal sovereign immunity); Fair
Indian Gaming Act, H.R. 334, 105th Cong. (1998) (amending the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to
shift the burden of proof from a state to an Indian tribe in a compact negotiation-related action initiated
by a tribe); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, S. 544, 106th Cong.
(1999) (preventing Secretary of Interior from promulgating regulations allowing for tribal gaming
without a state-tribal compact); Tobacco Smuggling Eradication Act of 1999, H.R. 2503, 106th Cong.
(1999) (adding labeling requirements to tobacco products sold on Indian reservations); H.R. 2761,
111th Cong. (2009) (severing United States’ government relations with the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma until such time as the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma restores full tribal citizenship to the
Cherokee Freedmen disenfranchised in the March 3, 2007, Cherokee Nation vote and fulfills all its
treaty obligations with the Government of the United States, and for other purposes); S. 1948, 115th
Cong. (2017) (abrogating the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes as a defense in inter partes review
of patents); H.R. 4637, 117th Cong. (2021) (severing United States Government relations with the
Creek Nation of Oklahoma until such time as the Creek Nation of Oklahoma restores full tribal
citizenship to the Creek Freedmen disenfranchised in the October 6, 1979, Creek Nation vote and
fulfills all its treaty obligations with the Government of the United States, and for other purposes).
108. The few bills that include limits on tribal authority that do receive hearings are often tribespecific bills that have the support of the tribal government to be affected by the bill. For examples
of water rights settlements in which Congress has limited tribal rights, see Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549 (waiving tribal sovereign
immunity when United States has certain claims against the Community); Zuni Indian Tribe Water
Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-34, 117 Stat. 782 (extinguishing tribal and allottees’
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Moreover, Congress rarely enacts legislation over the unified
opposition of tribal governments.109 Tribal governments and
organizations have successfully prevented Congress from enacting
legislation harmful to Indian Country.110 My research shows that
Congress enacted less than 1% of all Indian-related bills with unified
Indian opposition in the 97th, 100th, 103th, 106th, and 109th
Congresses.111 More frequently, when Indians opposed a bill, Congress
amended the bill to satisfy at least some of the Indian opponents’
concerns.112 In short, Congress enacts very few bills with unified Indian
opposition and is much more likely to enact bills that Indians oppose if a
committee amends the bill in response to Indian opposition.
This reluctance on the part of Congress to limit tribal authority or enact
legislation in the face of tribal opposition is significant for two reasons.
First, it demonstrates that Congress takes the abrogation of tribal powers
very seriously. Second, the high rate of amendment for bills opposed by
Indians indicates that Congress wants tribes to play an active role in
lawmaking. Congress is no longer interested in the passive application of
federal law to Indians. The modern federal-tribal relationship is about
making federal law with Indians, not for them.113
Not only has Congress been reluctant to limit tribal authority, but it has
recently been more inclined to restore inherent tribal authority. As
detailed in the next section, Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation
that recognizes the inherent sovereignty of tribal governments, often as a
way of correcting Supreme Court decisions that diminish tribal
sovereignty.114
***
water rights and limiting their ability to bring claims); Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064, (White Mountain Apache and Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlements)
(limiting tribal water rights and claims); Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-223, 128 Stat. 2096, (Hualapai Tribe) (limiting ability of a tribe to transfer water
rights). For a discussion of federal recognition bills that propose to limit tribal jurisdiction and/or
authority, see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress, Tribal Recognition, and Legislative-Administrative
Multiplicity, 91 IND. L.J. 955, 985–91 (2016).
109. Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation, supra note 68, at 74 (finding that Congress
enacted less than 1% of federal bills related to Indians that American Indians uniformly testified
against in the 97th, 100th, 103rd, 106th, and 109th Congresses).
110. Id. at 74–76 (finding a significant statistical relationship between unified Indian opposition to
a bill and the bill’s enactment).
111. Id. at 74.
112. Id. at 77 (finding that Congress amended 50% of the bills that Indian opponents sought to
change to satisfy at least some of the concerns Indians raised).
113. Deloria, supra note 21, at 217–18; Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 973;
Blackhawk, supra note 57, at 1838.
114. See infra section I.B.
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Largely in response to tribal advocacy, Congress and tribal
governments have relied on foundational principles of federal Indian law
to remake the federal-tribal relationship and federal Indian law through a
series of statutes. The result has been the crafting of a statutory framework
informed by the lived experiences of tribal leaders and their people.
Statutes, however, are read, interpreted, and implemented by judges and
agencies. As section I.B demonstrates, courts have not always read federal
Indian law statutes in ways that honor Congress’s policy choices or
foundational principles of federal Indian law.
B.

Not Keeping Up with Federal Indian Law and Policy: Courts in an
Era of Tribal Self-Determination

In stark contrast to congressional efforts to recognize tribal
sovereignty, federal and state courts have increasingly departed from their
own precedents and decided cases at odds with current congressional law
and policy. The data on federal courts is indicative. Federal courts were
never consistent protectors of Native rights, but their decisions started
trending against American Indian litigants in the late 1970s.115 By the mid1980s, American Indians were accumulating losses in the Supreme
Court.116 Less than a decade later, tribal governments were losing over
75% of the cases heard by the Supreme Court.117
At the apex of the U.S. Court System, the Supreme Court’s behavior
guides that of federal and state courts. As many of my federal Indian law
colleagues have detailed elsewhere, the Supreme Court has diverged from
foundational Indian law principles and congressional policy as it has
increasingly found against Indian interests.118 The Supreme Court has
115. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding that tribes
have no criminal authority over non-Indians in Indian Country); Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478–83 (1976) (allowing states to tax
cigarette purchases by Indians to non-Indians on reservation lands).
116. Getches, supra note 17, at 273–74.
117. Id. The success rate for Native interests has improved in recent years. See Bethany Berger,
Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court? Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar
General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901 (2017); Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The
Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277 (2018). However, tribal governments still experience devastating losses.
See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022) (holding that the state of
Oklahoma has concurrent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian Country).
118. Or as Professor Fletcher more succinctly puts it, “Indian law commentators have long argued
that the Supreme Court’s federal Indian law jurisprudence is illegitimate.” Fletcher, Muskrat
Textualism, supra note 26, at 1026. A vast literature has developed criticizing the Supreme Court for
departing from foundational Indian law principles and congressional policy. See, e.g., id. at 974–86
(arguing that the Supreme Court has used Canary textualism to depart from foundational principles

Carlson (Do Not Delete)

2022]

BRINGING CONGRESS AND INDIANS BACK IN

10/25/22 9:10 AM

743

“veered away from the foundations of Indian law.”119 It has ignored its
own precedents favorable to tribal rights and abandoned its earlier
approach of relying on Congress “to decide clearly the bounds of Indian
sovereignty.”120 The Court has not deferred to Congress as required by the
foundational principles of federal Indian law. Instead, it has refused to
acknowledge Congress’s constitutionally mandated power over Indian
affairs. The Court has relied on laws repudiated by Congress, limited the
impact of laws enacted by Congress to further tribal sovereignty, and cast
aside the canons of statutory construction, choosing to invoke them only
when desired.121 It has tried to remake federal Indian law on terms much
and congressional policy); Fletcher, supra note 23, at 128 (explaining that the Supreme Court should
but often chooses not to follow congressional policy); Getches, supra note 17, at 273–91
(documenting the Supreme Court’s shift away from foundational principles of federal Indian law
during the Rehnquist era); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 436, 443–71 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court “has been engaged
in aggressive institutional and doctrinal revisionism, essentially displacing Congress as the federal
agency with front-line responsibility for federal Indian policy”); Skibine, supra note 17, at 28
(maintaining that the Court has systematically limited tribal sovereignty while increasing state
authority in Indian Country); Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty, the Negative
Doctrinal Feedback Loop, and the Rise of a New Exceptionalism, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 47, 47 (2005)
(explaining that the Court has departed from doctrinal and interpretive norms to reject tribal
sovereignty); Joseph William Singer, The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for Sovereignty: Canons
of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643
(2003) (“Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has led a massive assault on tribal
sovereignty.”); Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge
of the Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439, 439 (1999) (“[R]ecent developments in Indian law, particularly
at the United States Supreme Court, threaten [a] well understood and precarious balance with a new,
almost vicious, historical amnesia and doctrinal incoherence.”).
119. Getches, supra note 17, at 273–74 (“Indeed, the Court has forsaken not only those
foundational cases, but it has ignored most of the intervening 150 years of decisions, including nearly
all of its approximately eighty modern decisions.”). For example, a mere three years after Congress
enacted the Tribal Self-Determination Policy, the Court stripped Indian nations of their inherent
criminal authority to prosecute non-Indian offenders in Oliphant. 435 U.S. at 205–06. In Oliphant,
the Court departed from its previous practice of deferring to Congress in Indian affairs and introduced
a new doctrine, called implicit divestiture, which allowed the Court to divest tribal powers that it
deemed inconsistent with the tribe’s status as a domestic dependent nation. Id. at 206, 208. Prior to
the Oliphant decision, the Supreme Court had held that only Congress has plenary power over Indian
affairs and can determine the sovereign rights of Indian nations. The Court in Oliphant seemed to be
allocating plenary power to itself.
120. Getches, supra note 17, at 276.
121. See, e.g., Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Textualism and the Indian Canons of Statutory
Construction, 55 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 267 (2021) (documenting that the Supreme Court has failed
to apply the Indian canon of the statutory construction multiple times since 1987); Richard B. Collins,
Never Consented to Their Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 45–49
(2013) (recounting how the Supreme Court inconsistently applies the Indian law canons of statutory
construction); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1620 (1996) (noting that the courts have
retreated from their use of the Indian law canons of statutory construction); David C. Williams,
Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal Indian
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less favorable to tribal governments and peoples by developing a
“common law of colonialism.”122
Under a common law of colonialism, courts have abandoned the
presumptions mandated by the foundational principles and their own
precedents. Instead of asking whether Congress explicitly acted to deprive
tribal governments of their authority, the Supreme Court has asked a new
question: whether the tribal governments’ exercise of power is
“inconsistent with their status.”123 This change in the question asked has
enabled courts to read congressional silence as undermining tribal
sovereignty or worse, to replace congressional affirmations of tribal
authority with their own contrary assessments of tribal authority.124
Similarly, the Supreme Court has departed from the presumption that
states cannot exercise authority in Indian Country without express
congressional authority.125 Instead of asking whether Congress explicitly
Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 403–04 (1994) (noting that courts inconsistently apply the Indian canons
of construction in cases); Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court’s
(Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623, 650–87 (2011) (describing how the
Supreme Court has departed from the canons when tribal rights would impede on state sovereignty).
Some justices have purported to defer to Congress by relying on laws and policies repudiated by
Congress. Getches, supra, at 1620 (“[S]ome Justices, recognizing that definitions of tribal sovereignty
should be tied to some congressional action or policy, have begun looking to nineteenth-century
policies of allotment and assimilation as the benchmark for defining appropriate limits on Indian
autonomy.”).
Others have rewritten statutes to limit tribal authority. Collins, supra, at 53 (explaining that the
Court rewrote the Indian Country Crimes Act in Duro).
122. Getches, supra note 17, at 276 (“[T]he present Supreme Court is shunning its own legal
traditions and creating new rules that conform to its perceptions of current realities, instead of staying
its hand and forcing the political branches to deliberate the difficult choices.”); Frickey, supra note
118, at 452–60.
123. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. For a discussion of how Oliphant departed from the foundational
principles of federal Indian law, see for example Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire,
or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sovereignty?: The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in
FED. INDIAN L. STORIES 276–83 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
124. For a thorough discussion of how the Supreme Court did this in Oliphant and other cases, see
Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 986–99.
125. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022). A full analysis of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Castro-Huerta is beyond the scope of this article. Many scholars and tribal leaders
have condemned the majority opinion as contrary to the U.S. Constitution, see Derrick Beetso,
SCOTUS’ Decision in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Departs Wildly from U.S. Constitution,
INDIANZ.COM (July 7, 2022), https://www.indianz.com/News/2022/07/07/derrick-beetso-justicesignore-the-u-s-constitution-when-it-comes-to-indian-country/
[https://perma.cc/EQ4H-DRSE];
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In 5-4 Ruling, Court Dramatically Expands the Power of the States to
Prosecute
Crimes
on
Reservations,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
30,
2022),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/06/in-5-4-ruling-court-dramatically-expands-the-power-of-statesto-prosecute-crimes-on-reservations/ [https://perma.cc/XS3S-9W6X]; foundational principles of
federal Indian law, see Gregory Ablavsky & Elizabeth Reese, The Supreme Court Strikes
Again – This
Time
at
Tribal
Sovereignty,
WASH.
POST
(July
1,
2022),
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authorized state authority in Indian Country, the Supreme Court has
asked: has Congress preempted state authority in Indian Country?126 The
Court has effectively reversed the presumption, suggesting that Congress
has to act to limit state authority in Indian Country.127 By abandoning the
presumptions that Congress has to take clear and express action to limit
tribal sovereignty or to grant state authority in Indian Country, the
Supreme Court has increasingly placed the burden on tribal governments
and Native organizations to convince Congress to clarify its position on
Indian affairs in legislation.128
As other federal Indian law scholars have shown, the impact of the
Supreme Court’s departures from foundational principles of federal
Indian law has been devastating for Native governments and peoples.129
The Supreme Court has, inter alia, stripped tribal governments of their
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians130 and non-member Indians,131
extensively limited tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonIndians,132 permitted state taxation on Indian lands,133 allowed state
criminal jurisdiction over crimes against Indians in Indian Country;134 and
refused to recognize some tribal water rights.135
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/01/castro-huerta-oklahoma-supreme-courttribal-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/AU78-M4QK]; Elizabeth Hidalgo Reese, Conquest in the
Courts, THE NATION (July 6, 2022), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/supreme-court-castrohuerta/ [https://perma.cc/PL7E-7WJ5]; Beetso, supra; Fletcher, supra; prior court precedents, see
Ablavsky & Reese, supra; Reese, supra; treaties with the tribal governments, see Chuck Hoskin, Jr.,
U.S. Supreme Court Breaks Sacred Vow to Oklahoma Tribal Nations, INDIANZ.COM (July 5, 2022),
https://www.indianz.com/News/2022/07/05/chuck-hoskin-cherokee-nation-betrayed-by-u-ssupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/D3WX-6TY7]; and congressional policy, see Fletcher, supra.
126. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. at 2494.
127. The Supreme Court ignores almost 200 years of precedent in reframing the question this way.
See Fletcher, supra note 125; Nick Martin, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,
Explained, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 1, 2022), https://www.kosu.org/local-news/2022-07-05/thesupreme-courts-attack-on-tribal-sovereignty-explained [https://perma.cc/H4T2-W8SU]; Beetso,
supra note 125; Ablavsky & Reese, supra note 125; Reese, supra note 125.
128. Frickey, supra note 118, at 483 (noting how, in the past, tribal success in the courts placed the
legislative burden on tribal opponents, so that tribes were in the easier position of trying to defeat
reactive legislation rather than seeking legislation on their own behalf).
129. Getches, supra note 17, at 277–78; Frickey, supra note 118, at 458; Krakoff, supra note 118,
at 47.
130. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
131. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
132. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363–70 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442
(1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–67 (1981).
133. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,
478–83 (1976).
134. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022).
135. See Colo. River Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809–13, 820–21 (1976); Montana, 450
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The Court’s recent jurisprudence departs from foundational principles
by discounting modern tribal governments in favor of biased and outright
racist attitudes towards Native governments and peoples.136 Modern tribal
governments, inter alia, operate tribal health clinics, offering traditional
and Western-style medical care to tribal citizens and community
members; monitor environmental quality standards and manage natural
resources on tribal lands; teach tribal children in their native languages;
and exercise jurisdiction over child welfare cases, disputes between
members, and misdemeanor crimes.137 Many tribal governments
contribute to the economic development and sustainability in their
regions; some extensively employ both tribal citizens and non-tribal
U.S. at 565–67; Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113 (1983); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache,
463 U.S. 545, 570–71 (1983); see also Lloyd Burton, The American Indian Water Rights Dilemma:
Historical Perspective and Dispute-Settling Policy Recommendations, 7 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
1, 39 (1987) (noting that in 1987 Indian nations had lost five of the last six water rights cases brought
before the U.S. Supreme Court).
136. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 133 (listing some of the derogatory and racist
language used in Supreme Court opinions). As Professor Fletcher laments, negative portrayals of
Indian people persist in recent Supreme Court decisions. Id. (“One would like to think that a modern,
more enlightened Supreme Court would no longer characterize Indian people with dour derision and
mockery as a matter of course, but the Court’s framing of the ‘Indian-ness’ of the Cherokee father
and daughter in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl proves that hope wrong.”). For an even longer list of
derogatory statements made by the Supreme Court when talking about Indian tribes and peoples, see
Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 981–82.
The recent majority opinion in Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta continues this practice of relying on
negative portrayals of Native Nations. See generally Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486. The majority
largely accepts the state of Oklahoma’s unverified claims that the Court’s prior decision in Oklahoma
v. McGirt has led to chaos in law enforcement in Oklahoma. Id.; see also Kelsey Vlamis, Oklahoma
Spent Millions on a Legal and PR Campaign to Paint Reservations as ‘Lawless Dystopias’ and
Persuade the Supreme Court to Weaken Tribal Sovereignty, Experts Say, BUS. INSIDER (July 4, 2022),
https://www.businessinsider.com/oklahoma-tribal-land-as-lawless-dystopias-for-scotus-sovereigntyexperts-2022-7 [https://perma.cc/H7VW-HT84]; Beetso, supra note 125. As Gorsuch pointed out in
his dissent, the majority decided to rely on the state’s questionable numbers despite considerable
evidence to the contrary. See Rebecca Nagle & Allison Herrera, Where Is Oklahoma Getting Its
Numbers From in Its Supreme Court Case?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2022),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/scotus-oklahoma-castro-huerta-inaccurateprosecution-data/629674/ [https://perma.cc/TUX2-RPNV]; Curtis Killman, Most Released Due to
McGirt Have Been Charged Either Federally or Tribally, Tulsa World Analysis Finds, TULSA WORLD
(Feb. 20, 2022), https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/most-released-due-to-mcgirthave-been-charged-either-federally-or-tribally-tulsa-world-analysis/article_96e94b7e-6f30-11ec992c-9f9ace817196.html [https://perma.cc/HV2S-TGQM]; Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Oklahoma State
Officials Resist Supreme Court Ruling Affirming Tribal Authority over American Indian Country,
CONVERSATION (Apr. 8, 2022), https://theconversation.com/oklahoma-state-officials-resist-supremecourt-ruling-affirming-tribal-authority-over-american-indian-country-175726
[https://perma.cc/8HX8-WRXB].
137. See generally REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007); THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV.,
THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(2008).
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citizens.138 Moreover, tribal governments often govern more effectively
than the neighboring state and local governments.139 To cite a few
examples, tribal governments have enacted more stringent environmental
regulations to protect water and air quality than surrounding states,140 kept
families intact through reunification programs unmatched in state child
welfare systems,141 and bolstered their law enforcement departments to
ensure public safety.142 During the COVID-19 pandemic, tribal
governments provided vaccines to Natives and non-Natives long before
states did.143 As discussed previously, Congress has acknowledged the
success of tribal governments by increasingly enacting statutes to foster
tribal authority, whereas the Court has refused to follow Congress’s
lead.144 Contrary to congressional policy,145 the Court has sought to limit
tribal power while increasing the powers of state governments in Indian
Country.146 As a result, the Court’s decisions often undermine tribal
governance and economic development rather than encourage it.147
In departing from foundational principles, the Court has adopted

138. Mark Trahant, Tribes Are Large Employers & Those Employees Make the Best Customers,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 13, 2014), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/tribes-are-largeemployers-those-employees-make-the-best-customers [https://perma.cc/RM2V-ZYQA].
139. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribes Are Governing Well. It’s the States that Are Failing,
WASH. MONTHLY (Sept. 30, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/09/30/indian-tribes-aregoverning-well-its-the-states-that-are-failing/ [https://perma.cc/65RJ-KXWH].
140. Id.; Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative Environmental “Laboratories,” 86
COLO. L. REV. 789 (2015) (documenting tribal governments setting and enforcing their own
environmental standards).
141. Fletcher, supra note 139.
142. Id.; Carlson, supra note 136.
143. See, e.g., David Lee, Chickasaw Nation Offers Free Vaccines to All Oklahomans, Beating
State
Officials,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(Mar.
13,
2021),
https://www.courthousenews.com/chickasaw-nation-offers-free-vaccines-to-all-oklahomansbeating-state-officials/ [https://perma.cc/72QS-73PU] (documenting the Chickasaw Nation’s
provision of vaccines to all Oklahomans). The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development recognizes tribal governments for excellence in providing programs and services to
their communities. Honoring Nations, THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV.,
https://hpaied.org/honoring-nations [https://perma.cc/5NPD-GKNM]. More examples of good tribal
governance can be found in their annual reports honoring Native Nations. See, e.g., THE HARVARD
PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., HONORING NATIONS 2018 REPORT (2018),
https://hwpi.harvard.edu/files/hpaied/files/hn18_report_final_0.pdf?m=1639579085
[https://perma.cc/9MSY-LYCL] (highlighting tribal governmental awardees for good governance in
2018).
144. Singer, supra note 118, at 643; Getches, supra note 17, at 277–78.
145. See infra section II.B.1.
146. Singer, supra note 118, at 643.
147. Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 329 (2008).
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policies that do not reflect realities in Indian Country.148 Their decisions
frequently create highly unworkable situations because they do not reflect
the state of affairs in Indian Country.149 For example, Professor Getches
detailed how the Court’s splitting of zoning authority between the tribal
government and the county on the Yakama Indian Reservation undercut
regulatory efforts by both.150 The Court’s diminishment of tribal authority
over non-Indians and limitations on tribal taxation shows that the Court
does not understand or respect the role of tribal governments and how they
provide invaluable services to Natives and non-Natives in their local
communities.
The Court’s departure from foundational principles and congressional
policy has affected other institutions as well. It has led to confusion on the
ground as state, local, and tribal officials struggle to understand and apply
complicated jurisdictional rules.151 As a result, it can undermine good
governance, especially public safety in Indian Country.152 Moreover, the
Court’s divergence from foundational principles and congressional policy
has left lower federal and state courts confused about when to defer to
congressional policies and statutes and how to apply the canons of
statutory construction.153 The Court’s decisions have added a layer of

148. Krakoff, supra note 118, at 47 (“The Supreme Court’s vision of tribal sovereignty is sharply
at odds with the facts of tribal sovereignty on the ground.”); Frickey, supra note 118, at 458
(explaining how the Court’s decision in Oliphant did not reflect realities on the ground in Indian
Country in immunizing nonmembers from tribal authority); Getches, supra note 17, at 277–78 (noting
that the Court’s decisions in Brendale and Strate created policies problematic for both governments
and individuals in Indian Country). Other scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for its lack of
knowledge about tribal governments, Indian people, and Indian Country. See, e.g., Fletcher,
Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 145 (noting belief among tribal advocates that Supreme Court
judges do not respect tribal governments or know about how their decisions affect Native peoples);
Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 1027 (explaining how the questions asked by Justices
at oral arguments reveal how little they know about tribal governments and their citizens).
149. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 976. Professor Fletcher argues that the
Supreme Court is more concerned with what it thinks the state of affairs ought to be in Indian Country
rather than what it is.
150. Getches, supra note 17, at 277-78. Getches also notes the problems caused by the Court’s
decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, which held that non-Indian plaintiffs could not bring personal
jury actions for accidents occurring on a right-of-way for a state highway within the reservation. 550
U.S. 438 (1997); id. at 278. Similar unworkable situations have arisen from the Court’s limits on tribal
criminal and civil jurisdiction. For a detailed discussion of the problems created by the Court’s
stripping tribal governments of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, see AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF
INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA
(2006); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Jurisdiction and Human Rights Accountability in Indian Country,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 355 (2013).
151. Getches, supra note 17, at 277–78.
152. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 150, at 28.
153. Getches, supra note 121, at 1612–14; Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 130
(noting confusion in the lower courts).
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inconsistency and unpredictability, making federal Indian law confusing
and hard to navigate, especially for judges, who tend to be unfamiliar with
Native communities and the history of federal-tribal relations.154
Tribal advocates, federal Indian law scholars, and even Congress have
attempted to redirect the Supreme Court as it has departed from
foundational principles of federal Indian law and congressional policy.155
Congress, often in response to tribal advocacy, has attempted to correct
the Supreme Court by enacting legislative overrides, or statutes meant to
overturn Supreme Court precedents.156 Tribal advocates’ success in
persuading Congress to reverse, at least in part, two major Supreme Court

154. Getches, supra note 17, at 275. See also Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the
Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36
TULSA L.J. 267, 267 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence in the field of federal
Indian law has mystified both academics and practitioners.”); Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109
YALE L.J. 1, 4–5 (1999) (“Given the lack of guidance in positive law, the complexity of the issues,
and the tangled normative questions surrounding the colonial displacement of indigenous peoples to
construct a constitutional democracy, it is also not surprising that the resulting decisional law is as
incoherent as it is complicated.”); Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox, supra note 118, at 439;
Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27 N.M. L. REV.
273, 275 (1997) (“Contemporary confusion in Indian law results from a failure to recognize Indian
law’s close familial ties to constitutional doctrines that lie at the core of the Supreme Court’s concerns
during the last century.”); Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in
the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 218 (1993) (“No area of American law is
more distinct, anomalous, or confused than that relating to Native Americans.”); Frank Pommersheim,
Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7, 38–39 (1996) (“One need
only read a sampling of recent United States Supreme Court Indian law opinions . . . to realize that
the nation’s high court has slipped into doctrinal incoherence.”); Laurie Reynolds, “Jurisdiction” in
Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359,
360 (1997) (“For lower courts trying to decipher the implications of these pronouncements on tribal
jurisdiction, the Court’s conflicting signals have created confusion and uncertainty.”); Brad Jolly,
Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of Termination Continues, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273, 278 (1997) (“Over the past century, the legal fiction of federal Indian law has
matured into a grotesque creature capable of inflicting instant disorientation, bewilderment, and
nausea.”); Ray Torgerson, Note, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment of the
Federal Trust Doctrine in American Indian Law, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 165, 178 (1996) (“Most
academics and courts agree that the area of Indian law is fraught with vacillation and incoherence.”).
See generally Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New Confusion to the Law
of Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 77 (National Lawyers Guild Committee on Native
American Indian Struggles ed., 1982).
For a discussion of federal judges and the difficulties many face in adjudicating federal Indian law
cases, see Kirsten Matoy Carlson, In Memoriam: Judge Murphy’s Indian Law Legacy, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 38, 38–41 (2018).
155. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 23, at 123 (arguing that the Supreme Court should follow
congressional policy). Some scholars have criticized Congress for not doing enough to curb the Court
or keep up with the growing field of federal Indian law.
156. For a discussion of how tribal advocates have sought legislative overrides of Supreme Court
decisions, see Carlson, supra note 68, at 1185–95.
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decisions limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction—Duro and Oliphant157—
illustrates how Congress has acted to correct detrimental federal Indian
law policies made by the Supreme Court.158
Congress acted swiftly to reverse the Court’s decision in Duro. In
Duro, the Court created a jurisdictional gap in Indian Country by holding
that no government (state, tribal, or federal) had the authority to prosecute
non-member Indians for crimes in Indian Country.159 Congress remedied
this situation by enacting legislation restoring inherent tribal authority.160
In enacting the Duro legislation, Congress chose not to delegate power to
the tribes (as it had in the past), but returned to foundational principles of
federal Indian law by recognizing and restoring tribal governments’
inherent authority over non-member Indians.161 In doing so, Congress
made it harder for the Supreme Court to overturn the statute. This strategy
worked. Congress successfully redirected the Supreme Court, which
upheld the constitutionality of the Duro legislation in United States v.

157. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court undercut tribal sovereignty by
stripping tribal governments of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The
Court extended this limitation on tribal criminal jurisdiction in Duro v. Reina by holding that Indian
nations did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
158. Scholars have documented the efforts made by tribal advocates to enact legislation overturning
Duro v. Reina. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40
TULSA L. REV. 5, 11–13 (2004) (describing tribal advocacy leading up to the enactment of the Duro
Fix); Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
109, 110 (1992) (recounting the role tribal governments and advocates played in the enactment of the
Duro Fix). See also Carlson, supra note 47, at 65–69. For a discussion of the tribal advocacy leading
to the partial Oliphant reversal in the Violence Against Women Act of 2013, see Carlson, Lobbying
as Tribal Resilience, supra note 68, at 1187–95.
Congress has enacted several other statutes in an attempt to redirect the Supreme Court. For
example, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in response to
the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Court then limited
RFRA’s application to state and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
In response to City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000. For more information on RFRA, see The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Primer,
CONG. RSCH. SERV. (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11490 (last visited Aug.
25, 2022).
Congress’s reversal of Supreme Court decisions has extended to tribe-specific as well as pan-tribal
legislation. For example, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians turned to
Congress after the Supreme Court allowed a non-Indian individual to challenge the Secretary of the
Interior’s acquisition of 147 acres in trust for the tribe. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012). Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land
Reaffirmation Act, which affirmed the trust acquisition and removed the matter from federal court
jurisdiction. Act of Sept. 26, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014). The Supreme Court
upheld the statute in Patchak v. Zinke, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
159. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
160. Carlson, supra note 47, at 65–66.
161. Id.
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Lara.162 Congress adopted a similar approach when it enacted a partial
Oliphant reversal in the 2013 Violence Against Women Act
Reauthorization Act.163 The Act included a section restoring the inherent
power of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
persons committing four specific intimate partner-related crimes in Indian
Country.164 In 2022, Congress recognized the inherent authority of tribal
governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over six additional crimes
when committed by non-Indians.165 Congress’s expansion of its
recognition of tribal governments’ inherent power of criminal jurisdiction
at a time when the Court tends to limit tribal authority exemplifies the
Court’s divergence from congressional policy and foundational principles
of federal Indian law.
II.

THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN
INDIANS: RECONCILING AND RECENTERING FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW

The Restatement of the Law of American Indians retells federal Indian
law in a way that allows for the closing of the gap between statutory and
decisional law. More than twenty years ago, Professor Getches wrote,
“Absent a judicial rediscovery of Indian law, Congress will have to
legislate to correct the Court’s misadventures.”166 The Restatement seeks
to avoid the need for constant congressional correction and instead invites
the Court to enter the modern Indian law era in a way that respects its
proper role in the separation of powers. This Part shows how the
Restatement on the Law of American Indians reflects how Congress and
tribal governments have remade the federal-tribal relationship and directs
courts to act consistent with congressional policy and foundational
principles of federal Indian law. First, this Part explains how the
Restatement provides the courts with an opportunity to self-correct rather
than wait for Congress to redirect them. Second, it shows how the
Restatement directs courts to follow foundational principles of federal
162. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
163. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013).
164. Id. at § 904 (acknowledging inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence,
dating violence, and criminal violations of a qualifying protection order). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
165. See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2022: SPECIAL TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION,
https://res.cloudinary.com/ncai/image/upload/v1649443190/Website%20General/STCJ_Overview_xkgtef.pdf [https://perma.cc/66PK-48JH] (extending recognition of inherent tribal
criminal jurisdiction to child violence, sexual violence, stalking, sex trafficking, obstruction of justice,
and assaults of tribal justice personnel); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1304.
166. Getches, supra note 17, at 269.

Carlson (Do Not Delete)

752

10/25/22 9:10 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:725

Indian law, which emphasize Congress’s primacy in Indian affairs, the
trust relationship, the upholding of tribal sovereignty unless Congress has
spoken to the contrary, and the absence of state authority in Indian
Country without express congressional authorization. Third, it
demonstrates how the Restatement reflects the federal-tribal relationship
forged by Congress and tribal governments by providing courts with
specific guidance on interpreting federal statutes in accordance with
congressional policy.
A.

A Restatement to Clarify Federal Indian Law for the Courts

The Restatement of the Law of American Indians presents an
opportunity for clarification in this often-confused area of the law.
Restatements are projects undertaken by the American Law Institute
(ALI), a research and advocacy group of judges, scholars, and lawyers,
that seeks “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and
its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of
justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal
work.”167 Restatement projects are created through a collaborative process
that relies on multi-layered drafting, review and comment processes, and,
ultimately, a vote by the entire membership of the ALI.168
The significance of the ALI drafting a Restatement of the Law of
American Indians is twofold. First, in undertaking the project, the ALI has
elevated federal Indian law, often marginalized within American legal
circles,169 and signaled the importance of the subject matter to courts and

167. How It Works, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/
[https://perma.cc/2UM9-EACH].
168. For a description of the process of Restatement drafting, see Norman L. Greene, The American
Law Institute: A Selective Perspective on the Restatement Process, 62 HOW. L.J. 511, 519–20 (2019)
(describing the extensive vetting and public scrutiny that occurs during the drafting of a Restatement).
See also RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS, Restatements (excerpt of the Revised Style
Manual approved by the ALI Council in January 2015), Nature of a Restatement, at ix (AM. L. INST.,
Proposed Official Draft 2021) (describing the four elements in the ALI process of drafting a
Restatement).
169. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993) (arguing that “[f]ederal
Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law. . . .”). For decades, scholars have
argued that federal Indian law should be given more prominence within American law. See Joseph
William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991); Joseph William Singer,
Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in
Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 5 (2017); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 701–02 (1989); Blackhawk, supra note 57,
at 1863–64.
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the legal community more generally.170 Judges, scholars, and practitioners
generally view the ALI positively.171 ALI products, including
Restatements, “have played a significant role in the American legal
landscape.”172 Courts are not bound to follow a Restatement under rules
of stare decisis, but many judges give great weight to Restatements.173
Because of the prestige of the ALI and its projects, the creation of the
Restatement of the Law of American Indians has the potential to influence
the development of federal Indian law over time.174
Second, the choice of a Restatement indicates that the ALI sought to

170. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS, Forward, at xix (AM. L. INST., Proposed
Official Draft 2021) (“The subject matter of this Restatement predates the birth of our nation. Some
of the most important early decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, including ones
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, deal with the Law of American Indians. And tribes, along
with the federal government and the states, are one of the three categories of sovereigns in the United
States. Yet, for its first nine decades the Institute devoted little attention to this area, which is of both
great intellectual and practical importance.”).
171. See Greene, supra note 168, at 514; Kristin David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons
from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 436 (2004) [hereinafter Lessons] (noting
that the American Law Institute is held in high esteem); Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 698 (1998); Herbert
P. Wilkins, Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, Partisanship, and the Restatements
of Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567, 567 (1998) (“The American Law Institute has been a major force
in the sound development of American law.”).
The ALI’s generally favorable reputation has not made it immune from serious critiques of its
Restatement projects. Jack Van Doren, A Restatement of Jurisprudence: Why Not?, 44 GONZ. L. REV.
159, 163–67 (2008–2009); Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, Restatements of Statutory
Law: The Curious Case of the Restatement of Copyright, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 285, 285 (2021);
Adams, supra, at 438–39. For more general critiques of the ALI, see Alex Elson, The Case for an InDepth Study of the American Law Institute, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625 (1998); Kristen David
Adams, The American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173
(2007) [hereinafter Ministry].
172. Balganesh & Menell, supra note 171, at 286.
173. Greene, supra note 168, at 512; Adams, supra note 171, at 436 (“Because of the high level of
respect that the American Law Institute has earned, the Restatements’ taking a certain position is
likely to influence the development of the law.”); Wilkins, supra note 171, at 569 (“Although no one
has to follow the Institute’s lead, many lawyers have urged, and many judges have ruled on reflection,
that principles of law that the Institute has developed should be accepted.”).
174. Commentators have attributed the weight given to ALI Restatements to the prestige of the
ALI and its collaborative, scholarly process for drafting Restatements. See, e.g., Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Restatement of the Law for American Indians: The Process and Why It Matters, 80
MONT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“The Restatement is supposed to be law so encased in concrete that it
cannot be disturbed, so uncontroversial that no one in their right mind would disagree or argue that it
is incorrect. It is the consensus of the vast majority, the great weight of the majority.”). The ALI
explains, “Restatements scan an entire legal field and render it intelligible by a precise use of legal
terms to which a body reasonably representative of the legal profession, The American Law Institute,
has ultimately agreed.” RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS, Restatements (excerpt of
the Revised Style Manual approved by the ALI Council in January 2015), at ix (AM. L. INST., Proposed
Official Draft 2021). It continues to state that the authority of a Restatement derives “from its
competence in drafting precise and internally consistent articulations of the law.” Id. at x.
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clarify the law for courts. Restatements are primarily aimed at courts and
reflect the law as it currently stands or might appropriately be stated by a
court.175 In contrast to a Restatement, the ALI could have drafted a model
code to provide legislatures with recommendations for statutory language
or principles to guide legislatures, administrative agencies, or private
actors about the best practices for either private or public institutions.176
Instead the ALI chose to restate the law and directed its Restatement at
courts and practitioners rather than legislatures and governmental
agencies.177 This selection of a Restatement as the tool for clarifying
federal Indian law suggests some acknowledgement of the need to provide
courts with intelligible principles in this area.178
Consistent with ALI’s approach to Restatements generally, the
Restatement of the Law of American Indians seeks to reformulate the law
to make it “clearer and more coherent” without transforming it too
much.179 It does this by retelling federal Indian law in a manner consistent
with the reframing of the federal-tribal relationship by Congress and tribal
governments in the past fifty years. In doing so, it presents courts with an
opportunity to realign the common law to make it more consistent with
statutory federal Indian law and more reflective of the lived experiences
of Native governments and peoples. In other words, it reminds courts of
the two most important negotiators of federal Indian law–Congress and
Indians—and invites them to make decisions consistent with these two
important parties’ view of the federal-tribal relationship. The
interpretative choices made in the Restatement direct courts to act
consistently with congressional policy and return to foundational
principles of federal Indian law in their decision making.
B.

The Restatement Urges Courts to Return to Foundational Indian
Law Principles
Consistent with how Congress and tribal governments have remade the

175. A.L.I., supra note 30. For a discussion of the ongoing debate over whether the ALI’s purpose
in making Restatements is to describe or reform the law, see for example Jeanne C. Fromer & Jessica
Silbey, Retelling Copyright: The Contributions of the Restatement of Copyright Law, 44 COLUM. J.
L. & ARTS 341, 345–49 (2021). Van Doren, supra note 171, at 162–65.
176. A.L.I., supra note 30; Fromer & Silbey, supra note 175, at 349 (explaining that model codes
provide “explicit recommendations for statutory language or guiding principles for statutory
enactments”).
177. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 175, at 348–49.
178. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS, Restatements (excerpt of the Revised Style
Manual approved by the ALI Council in January 2015), at ix (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
2021) (“For the most part Restatements thus assume a body of shared doctrine enabling courts to
render their judgments in a consistent and reasonably predictable manner.”).
179. Id.
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federal-tribal relationship, the Restatement of the Law of American
Indians emphasizes the need for courts to return to the foundational
principles of federal Indian law. The Reporter’s Introduction to Chapter 1
on the Federal-Tribal relationship identifies the foundational principles of
federal Indian law as:
First, Congress’s authority over Indian affairs is plenary and
exclusive. As a concomitant principle, the federal government
holds responsibilities to Indian tribes and individual Indians
known as the trust relationship.
Second, the sovereign authority of Indian tribes is inherent, and
is not delegated or granted by the United States, but can be limited
or restricted by Congress. An important concomitant principle is
that courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to
undermine Indian self-government.
Third, state governments have no authority to regulate Indian
affairs absent express Congressional delegation or grant.180
This section demonstrates how the Restatement retells federal Indian law
in accordance with the modern federal-tribal relationship by reiterating
the foundational Indian law principles.
1.

Congress Has Plenary Authority Over Indian Affairs as Guided by
the Federal Trust Relationship

The Restatement returns to the foundational principles of federal Indian
law by reiterating the primacy of Congress as the maker of federal Indian
law.181 In contrast to court decisions, which have downplayed the role of
Congress, departed from congressional policy, and inconsistently applied
the Indian law canons of statutory construction,182 section 7 of the
Restatement describes “Congressional Authority” as Congress’s “broad
authority to legislate in respect to Indian tribes and individual Indians.”183
180. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS, ch. 1, at 2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
181. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Restatement as Aadizookaan, 2022 WIS. L. REV. 197, 204 (2022)
(“Federal plenary power is one of the foundational principles of federal Indian law.”).
182. See supra section I.B.
183. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
2021). Section 7 continues,
[s]ources of Congressional authority include without limitation: (a) The Indian Commerce
Clause; (b) Treaties with Indian tribes made in accordance with the Treaty Power, which
empowers Congress to enact federal legislation necessary to implement certain treaty terms (see
§§ 5, 6); (c) The Territory and Property Clause, which empowers Congress to regulate lands
owned or supervised within Indian country; (d) The Necessary and Proper Clause; and (e) The
general trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes and their members (see
§ 4).
Id.
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The language in section 7 recognizes Congress’s constitutional authority
over Indian affairs, and thus, emphasizes Congress’s role in crafting the
federal-tribal relationship. An implicit corollary of this principle is that
courts are to defer to Congress rather than make federal Indian law.184
The comments to section 7 summarize the nature of congressional
power and synthesize the evolution of congressional authority over time.
The retelling of this story is important because it emphasizes the dynamic
nature of the federal-tribal relationship.185 The Restatement frames that
relationship, like Congress has, as political, participatory, and based upon
explicit recognition of tribal sovereignty and the trust relationship.186
Scholars, judges, and legal practitioners have long debated Congress’s
plenary power over Indian affairs187 but, unlike the Restatement, they
frequently do not consider it in terms of the modern federal-tribal
relationship.188 The language of and comments to section 7 contextualize
plenary power by placing it squarely within the contours of the modern
federal-tribal relationship. Courts cannot appropriately apply federal
Indian law, including section 7, without an accurate understanding of how
Congress has framed the federal-tribal relationship with tribal

184. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 127; Frickey, supra note 118, at 459–60; Getches, supra note 17,
at 273.
185. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS:
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 53 (2008).
186. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 cmt. a. (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
187. See Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RSCH. J. 1, 12
(1987); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1079, 1087–90 (2004); INDIAN L. RES. CTR., NATIVE LAND LAW 154–55 (Laws. ed. 2012);
VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS
79 (1999); Robert Laurence, Learning to Live With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian
Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 418–28 (1988);
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor
Laurence’s Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ.
L. REV. 439, 441 (1988); Mark Savage, Native Americans and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 59 (1991); Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian
Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1164–66 (1995); Frank Pommersheim, At the
Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48, 52–53
(2010); Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63
UCLA L. REV. 666, 669–73 (2016).
188. But see Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 980 (“In the modern era, congressional
plenary power is tempered by the rising political and economic power of Indian tribes.”); Deloria,
supra note 21, at 218 (“If we have moved from negotiating treaties in 1778, through periods of
oppressive unilateral actions by the federal government, to the present posture of adopting negotiated
settlements once again, then federal Indian law is something entirely different than we have previously
imagined.”).
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governments.189
The language and comments of section 7 reflect the ongoing
relationship between tribal governments and Congress and how they have
remade it in the past fifty years. With the development of the Tribal SelfDetermination Policy, Congress has recognized its political relationship
with tribal governments and the importance of tribal participation in
federal lawmaking.190 As discussed in section I.A, increased tribal
participation has led to substantive changes in Indian-related statutes,
which increasingly align with foundational principles of federal Indian
law.191
The text of section 7 reflects the evolution of the federal-tribal
relationship by acknowledging the foundational principle that Congress
plays a primary role in Indian affairs. Congress has increasingly owned
and exercised this role. It has renewed its relationship with tribal
governments by inviting them to participate in federal lawmaking and
enacting statutes to govern the relationship.192 Federal Indian law has
become a law of statutes with members of Congress introducing 7,714
bills relating to Indians from 1975 to 2012, and enacting 974 of them.193
During this time period, Congress enacted twice as many Indian-related
bills it did bills generally.194 A shift in the substance of federal statutes
governing the federal-tribal relationship has accompanied the increased
attention that Congress has devoted to Indian affairs. As detailed in
section I.A, many Indian-related statutes incorporate the foundational
principles of federal Indian law.195
The Restatement shows how the context of the federal-tribal
relationship helps to clarify the troubling question of the scope of
Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs.196 As comment a to
section 7 states, “Congress also has authority to recognize and regulate

189. Understanding plenary power, as embodied in section 7, requires in-depth knowledge of the
federal-tribal relationship as it develops between Congress and tribal governments. It is this
relationship that informs Congress in its exercise of its constitutional power over Indian affairs.
Fletcher, supra note 181, at 204; Deloria, supra note 21, at 205, 218.
190. See supra section I.A.
191. See supra section I.A.
192. See supra section I.A.
193. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 112–16 (2015).
194. Id. at 115–16.
195. See supra section I.A.
196. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 187, at 445–49 (arguing that the plenary power doctrine gives
the United States unfettered power over Indians); Laurence, supra note 187, at 422–28 (arguing that
plenary power is limited and counterbalanced by tribal sovereignty).
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inherent tribal authority.”197 Comment b then acknowledges that
historically Congress has wielded its plenary power both to protect and to
harm tribal governments and their peoples.198 The vast scope of
Congress’s plenary power seems daunting until it is situated within the
federal-tribal relationship.
Consistent with the foundational principles and section 7 of the
Restatement, Congress’s actions and inactions indicate that it takes its
constitutional role as the institution with primary but limited authority
over Indian affairs seriously. Consider first what Congress has not done
in the past fifty years. It has not terminated a tribal government recognized
by the United States. Nor has Congress enacted legislation that would in
general strip tribal governments of jurisdiction, authority, or sovereign
immunity.199 In the few instances in which Congress has limited the
authority of specific tribal governments, it appears to have sought tribal
input first.200 This engagement, along with the extremely low rate of
197. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
198. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
199. See supra section I.A. Congress has considered several bills that would limit tribal
jurisdiction, authority, or sovereign immunity of tribal governments, but it has chosen not to enact
any of them. Congress has come close to waiving tribal sovereign immunity, but then changed its
mind. For example, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-638, as originally enacted, required tribes to obtain liability insurance, which contained a
provision that the insurance carrier would waive the defense of tribal sovereign immunity in suits
related to the contract. Id. § 103. These provisions were amended by the ISDEAA Amendments of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, which provided that “tort claims against tribes, tribal organizations, Indian
contractors, and their employees . . . be considered claims against the United States and covered to
the full extent of the [Federal Tort Claims Act].” COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 17, at 1391. The amendments retained the insurance requirements (but required the
Secretary of the Interior rather than the tribe to obtain the insurance) and the provisions mandating
that insurance carriers waive the defense of tribal sovereign immunity in suits under the contracts.
Another statute, the Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act, Pub.
L. No. 106-179 (2000), does not expressly waive tribal sovereign immunity but mandates that
contracts with Indian tribes requiring federal approval include provisions either disclosing or waiving
immunity. Congress considered other options, including waiving tribal sovereign immunity, S. Rep.
No. 106-150, at 11–12 (1999), but ultimately Congress chose not to enact such a waiver.
200. Congress has occasionally limited the tribal jurisdiction, authority or sovereign immunity of
a specific tribe, usually with the consent of the tribal government. For example, Congress has waived
tribal sovereign immunity in several water rights settlement acts, presumably with the consent of the
tribe as the tribal government had to consent to the water rights settlement agreement. See, e.g., Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-512 (1988) (waiving tribal
sovereign immunity when United States has certain claims against the Community); Zuni Indian Tribe
Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-34 (waiving tribal sovereign immunity in
specified litigation); Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291 (White Mountain Apache
and Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlements) (waiving sovereign immunity of the tribe and United
States in lawsuits arising from the agreement); Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-223 (Hualapi Tribe) (waiving tribal sovereign immunity for claims arising
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enactment of bills uniformly opposed by tribal governments and
organizations,201 suggests that Congress now views tribal participation in
federal lawmaking as essential.202 My recent research confirms this. It
demonstrates that Congress responds to tribal opposition by either
refusing to enact the bill or amending it to satisfy at least some of the tribal
concerns.203 Based on these findings, it seems unlikely that Congress
would enact legislation restricting a tribal government’s authority without
its consent.204 If so, tribal participation may serve as a serious constraint
on congressional plenary power.205
Now consider what Congress has done: it has remade federal Indian
law in the past fifty years to align with foundational principles of federal
Indian law. In addition to enacting legislation recognizing tribal autonomy
and implementing the trust relationship,206 Congress has extended federal
recognition to more tribes than any other branch of the federal government
since 1978.207 In extending federal recognition to these Native Nations, it
has renewed its political relationship with and acknowledged its trust
obligations to them. Congress has also repeatedly restored inherent tribal
authority after the Supreme Court diminished it.208 These actions and
from the agreement). Congress has also limited tribal jurisdiction and/or authority in legislation
extending federal recognition to a specific tribe. Carlson, supra note 108, at 985–91 (documenting
how Congress has limited tribal criminal and/or civil jurisdiction, fishing and hunting rights, and
authority to conduct gaming in federal recognition).
201. Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation, supra note 68, at 74.
202. The high rates of testimony by tribal governments and Indian organizations at hearings on
Indian related bills also lends support to the conclusion that members of Congress place a premium
on tribal participation in federal lawmaking because Committee Chairs often invite witnesses to
testify. Id. at 72 (noting that tribal governments and organizations testified at 50% of the hearings
held on Indian related legislation).
203. Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation, supra note 68, at 82.
204. My findings confirm Vine Deloria, Jr.’s description of the modern federal-tribal relationship
as one of negotiation. Deloria, supra note 21, at 205, 218. He explained, “Negotiation allows people
to give and take, and they do not agree unless they feel they have done their very best to represent
their case.” Id. at 218.
205. I am not the first to suggest that tribal political power may cabin congressional plenary power.
As early as 1987, Professor Wilkinson suggested that Congress could not enact legislation opposed
by tribal governments. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 192–93
n.151 (1987); WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE, supra note 38, at 267. Other scholars have also made
this claim. Washburn, supra note 55, at 781; Berger, supra note 158, at 17. Professor Deloria made a
more subtle argument that tribal political power could limit congressional power by suggesting that
historical conditions have prevented Congress from acting as freely as broad formulations of the
plenary power doctrine might indicate. Deloria, supra note 21, at 210. More recently, Professor
Fletcher has indicated that the political power of tribes could curtail plenary power. Fletcher, Muskrat
Textualism, supra note 26, at 980.
206. See supra section I.A.
207. Carlson, supra note 108, at 957, 971–85.
208. See supra section I.B.
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inactions show that Congress takes its constitutional role as the institution
with primary authority over Indian affairs seriously. These actions and
inactions also suggest that Congress does not abrogate tribal authority
frequently or lightly as it may undercut the federal-tribal relationship it
has negotiated with tribes.
Further, as the comments to section 7 reflect, Congress knows its
powers are limited. As the comments to section 7 explain, both the trust
relationship209 and the Constitution210 cabin congressional power. These
comments might seem naïve given that Congress has historically enacted
policies intended to destroy tribal governments and diminish tribal land
bases.211 These limits, however, serve as meaningful constraints when
they are considered in the context of the federal-tribal relationship.
Congress has taken its trust obligations to tribal governments seriously in
crafting legislation.212 Despite court-created restrictions on the ability of
tribal governments to recover from the U.S. government for breach of
trust claims,213 Congress has repeatedly acknowledged and frequently
implemented its trust obligations to tribal governments over the past fifty
years.214 It has recognized the trust relationship in statutes governing, inter
alia, child welfare, housing, health care, and resource management.215
Congress appears to see its power as limited by its obligations under the
trust relationship to protect Indians.216
209. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021) (“Congress also retains plenary authority to legislate in light of the federal trust
responsibility to Indian tribes and individual Indians.”); id. § 7 cmt. d (“The general trust relationship
may independently constitute a source of authority for Congress to act in respect to Indian affairs. See
section 4. When Congress does act in accordance with the general trust relationship, courts note that
Congress’s authority is effectively enhanced.”).
210. Id. § 7 cmt. f (Fifth Amendment limitation).
211. For a discussion of these policies, see generally DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., & MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW (6th ed. 2011).
212. See supra section I.A.
213. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537
U.S. 488 (2003); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
214. For a discussion of how Congress has acknowledged and implemented its general trust
relationship through statutes, see supra section I.A. The enactment of these statutes suggests that the
trust relationship may carry more weight politically than legally.
215. Id.
216. Fletcher, supra note 181, at 205–06 (“Plenary power does not mean absolute power, it means
the power needed to fulfill a particular purpose. That purpose is the fulfillment of the federal trust
responsibility, also known as the duty of protection, to Indians and tribes. That purpose originates in
the treaty relationship between Indian tribes and the United States, and now extends to every federally
acknowledged tribe. This is the commitment.”).
Other sections of the Restatement reiterate Congress’s vision of the trust relationship as central to
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In accordance with this modern federal-tribal relationship, the
Restatement returns federal Indian law to foundational principles of
Indian law by recognizing the primacy of Congress in Indian affairs.
When considered in light of the federal-tribal relationship, the
Restatement reflects what Congress is doing, namely exercising its power
by recognizing tribal sovereignty and its duty of protection to tribal
governments and Indian peoples.217
2.

Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Authority Unless
Congress Has Expressed Clear and Plain Intent to Undermine
Indian Self-Government

Several sections of the Restatement reiterate the foundational principle
of federal Indian law that tribal governments retain inherent sovereign
authority unless Congress has expressed clear and plain intent otherwise.
This foundational principle includes two parts: the first affirms that tribal
governments retain inherent sovereign authority while the second

the federal-tribal relationship and a limit on congressional plenary power. Section 4 of the
Restatement states, “The United States recognizes a general trust relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes and their members arising from a government-to-government relationship
with preexisting sovereigns.” RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 4 cmt. a (AM. L.
INST., Proposed Official Draft 2021). Comment a to section 4 sets out the origins of the trust
relationship as a duty of protection arising from treaties and federal statutes. Id. (“The trust
relationship was first exemplified during the treaty-making process, when the United States either
explicitly or implicitly agreed to protect individual Indians and Indian tribes in exchange for title to
what would become the vast public domain. The federal trust relationship further arises from a series
of federal statutes reserving plenary control over Indian affairs in Congress and the executive branch,
regulating the disposition and control of Indian lands, and providing for law and order in Indian
country.”). The trust relationship not only stems from federal legislation but also, as Congress itself
acknowledges, serves as the basis for much of its Indian affairs legislation. Id. (“The general trust
relationship serves as a source of legal authority for the vast network of Indian-affairs statutes that
frame federal–tribal affairs.”). The comments to section 4 reflect the network of statutes enacted by
Congress in the past fifty years to meet its obligations under the trust relationship to safeguard the
property rights of tribal governments and individual Indians, to preserve tribal self-government, and
to provide government services. Id. § 4 cmts. c, d, e.
Discussed further in section II.B, section 9 also reinforces the trust relationship by providing courts
with guidance about how to interpret statutes passed in accord with the trust responsibility.
Restatement of the Law of American Indians section 9(a) states,
If tied rationally to the fulfillment of the United States’ trust relationship with Indians and Indian
tribes, see § 4, federal laws that treat Indians or Indian tribes differently from other individuals
or groups create political, not racial classifications and are not subject to strict scrutiny under the
equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. § 9(a). Consistent with the foundational principle of congressional plenary power and the modern
federal-tribal relationship, section 9 instructs courts to give deference to statutes enacted to further
the general trust relationship. In doing so, it emphasizes the modern federal-tribal relationship fostered
by Congress and tribal governments and the trust relationship as the guiding principle in the statutory
interpretation of federal statutes applicable to tribal governments and individual Indians.
217. Fletcher, supra note 181, at 205–06.
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establishes the clear statement rule that tribal sovereignty can only be
undermined by an express, clear, and plain statement by Congress.218
The Restatement reiterates the first part of the foundational principle in
three ways. First, it includes an entire chapter, chapter 2 on tribal
authority, which spells out the inherent authority retained by tribal
governments and affirms the first part of this foundational principle.219 A
full analysis of chapter 2 is beyond this scope of this article. Its very
inclusion in the Restatement confirms the importance of retained tribal
authority.
Second, section 5 on Treaties with Indian Tribes affirms the reserved
rights doctrine, which states that tribes retain any rights not ceded under
a specific treaty.220 Section 5 states that under their treaties with the
United States, tribal governments retain any rights not ceded to the United
States, abrogated by federal legislation, or altered by an amendment to the
treaty made by treaty signatories.221 Congress has frequently recognized
the retained rights of tribes in federal statutes.222 It has even refused to
abrogate treaty rights in terminating tribes223 and allotting tribal land.224
218. Clear statement rules are canons of statutory interpretation that compel an outcome unless
Congress has clearly stated otherwise. WILLIAM J. ESKRIDGE, JAMES J. BRUDNEY, JOSH CHAFETZ,
PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 651 (6th ed. 2020). For a discussion of clear statement rules in federal Indian law, see
Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 980 (“The clear statement rules are default rules
designed to allow Congress to run Indian affairs without interference from states, private interests,
and even the judiciary.”).
219. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 4 ch. 2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
220. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
221. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 5 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
2021) (“(a) Indian treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of the supreme law
of the land. (b) Indian treaties constitute reservations of rights by Indian tribes, not a grant of rights
to Indian tribes. (c) Indian treaty rights and related federal obligations continue in force until and
unless federal legislation abrogates the rights and obligations (see section 15), or the treaty signatories
agree to amend the treaty. (d) State laws and regulations conflicting with Indian treaty provisions are
invalid, unless authorized by federal legislation. (e) Indian treaties with States made after 1790 are
invalid, unless authorized by federal legislation.”). See also id. § 5 cmt. c, Reserved-rights doctrine
(“Rights expressly articulated in Indian treaties are reservations of inherent governmental rights of
Indian tribes and individual rights of individual Indians. Rights not addressed by Indian treaty
provisions are presumptively reserved; courts should interpret silence in the treaty in light of the
reserved-rights doctrine.”).
222. See supra section I.A.
223. See, e.g., Menominee Termination Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-399, 68 Stat. 250, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 891–902 (1970), repealed by 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (terminating the governmental status of the
Menominee Tribe); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (recognizing
the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee even after the United States government ceased to
recognize their governmental status).
224. See, e.g., Creek Allotment Agreement, ch. 676, Pub. L. No. 56-676, 31 Stat. 861 (1901)
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Third, as the previous discussion shows, congressional recognition that
tribal governments retain inherent sovereign authority is implied in
section 7. Congress has recognized tribal sovereignty as an essential
aspect of its modern relationship with tribal governments. Congress has
invited the participation of tribal governments in the lawmaking process
because it recognizes them as separate sovereigns.225 The legislative
actions taken by Congress demonstrate its commitment to recognizing
tribal sovereignty. In the past fifty years, it has acknowledged,
reacknowledged, or restored thirty-eight tribal governments, restored
inherent tribal authority over some criminals, and enacted and
implemented legislation recognizing tribal authority in housing, health
care, education, economic development, and many other areas.226
The second part of this foundational principle sets out the clear
statement rule that tribal sovereignty is retained unless and until Congress
expressly and with clear and plain intent says otherwise.227 The
Restatement incorporates this clear statement rule in section 5 on treaties
with Indian tribes, section 7 on congressional authority, and section 15 on
federal statutory regulation of tribal authority. All three sections recognize
that Congress has the authority to limit tribal authority.228 The comments
to section 5 and section 15 clarify the conditions under which Congress
can limit tribal authority. Comment e to section 5 limits congressional
power by stating that “[c]ongressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty
provisions must be clear and unambiguous.”229 Similarly, comment a to
section 15 explains, “The legislative intent to abrogate tribal authority
must be clear.”230 The canons of treaty and statutory construction in
(allotting lands of the Muskogee Creek Nation); Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199 § 1, Pub. L. No. 60140, 35 Stat. 312 (allotting lands of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma); McGirt v. Oklahoma, __
U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (finding that allotment did not abrogate treaty rights of the Muskogee
Creek Nation).
225. See GROSS, supra note 1, at 79, 86.
226. See supra section I.A.
227. As section I.B documents, courts have strayed from this foundational principle through the
doctrine of implicit divestiture.
228. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
2021) (recognizing the broad scope of congressional authority in Indian affairs); id. § 5 cmt. d
(Abrogation or partial abrogation by Congress) (“Congress retains authority to abrogate Indian treaty
provisions through ordinary legislation, subject to applicable constitutional restrictions.”); id. § 15
(“The United States has legislative authority to regulate tribal government authority.”).
The reiteration of this clear statement rule in multiple sections of the Restatement suggests that
courts should treat it as a “super-strong clear statement rule[],” which may only be overcome by
extremely clear statutory text. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 218, at 651.
229. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 5 cmt. e (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
230. Id. § 15 cmt. a.
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section 6 and section 8 also support the clear statement rule by suggesting
that courts should read treaties and statutes liberally and to the benefit of
Indian tribes.231 The liberal construction of treaties and statutes prohibits
courts from finding incursions on tribal sovereignty in cases where the
intent to limit tribal authority was not unequivocal, plain and clear. As
section I.A shows, the incorporation of this clear statement rule into the
Restatement is consistent with current congressional practice.232 In the
past fifty years, Congress has regularly refused to enact legislation that
would undermine tribal sovereignty and rarely enacted legislation over
unified tribal opposition even if the proposed legislation would not limit
tribal authority.
3.

State Governments Lack Authority over Indian Affairs Absent
Express Congressional Delegation or Grant

The other side of the foundational principle of congressional plenary
power embodied in section 7 is the foundational principle that states lack
authority over Indian affairs absent an express congressional delegation
or grant.233 This foundational principle has two parts. First, it recognizes
the lack of authority over Indian affairs left to state governments in the
U.S. Constitution.234 Second, it reiterates the clear statement rule that
Congress can only limit tribal authority through a clear and plain intent to
231. Id. § 6 (Canons of Construction of Indian Treaties) (“A treaty must be liberally interpreted in
favor of the relevant Indian tribes to give effect to the purpose of the treaty. Ordinary rules of
construction do not apply. Courts apply the following canons of construction: (a) Doubtful or
ambiguous expressions in a treaty must be resolved in favor of the relevant Indian tribes. (b) An Indian
treaty must be construed as the Indians understood it at the time of the treaty negotiation. (c) An
Indian treaty must be construed by reference to surrounding circumstances and history.”); id. § 8
(Canon of Construction of Indian-Affairs Statutes) (“Federal legislation addressing Indian affairs
must be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to the
benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.”).
232. See supra section I.A.
233. Fletcher, supra note 181, at 204 (“The First Congress preempted whatever remained in the
field in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, barring all interactions with Indians and tribes absent
federal consent.”). Other sections of the Restatement reinforce the foundational principle that states
lack authority over Indian absent an express congressional action to the contrary; see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 5(d) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2021)
(“State laws and regulations conflicting with Indian treaty provisions are invalid, unless authorized
by federal legislation.”); id. § 5(e) (“Indian treaties with States made after 1790 are invalid, unless
authorized by federal legislation.”).
The United States Supreme Court has recently questioned this foundational principle in Oklahoma
v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022).
234. See Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015)
[hereinafter Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause]; Clinton, supra note 187, at 1064–164;
Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014); MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4 (2016); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 17, at
94.
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do so by clarifying that Congress has to expressly grant authority over
Indian affairs for state governments to exercise any authority over Indian
affairs.235
The Restatement reiterates this foundational principle in section 7.
Comment g to section 7 emphasizes the general understanding, shared
historically and presently by scholars, judges, members of Congress, and
tribal governments, that the Indian Commerce Clause vested Indian affairs
authority in Congress to the exclusion of the states.236 This comment, as
well as the history detailed in the Reporters’ Notes, reflects congressional
practice as Congress has generally refused to vest any reserved authority
to the states since the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution.237
Comment g then clarifies that the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of
authority to the states does not change this because little to no residual
Indian affairs authority is left under the Constitution.238
Consistent with the Restatement, Congress has continued to limit state
authority in Indian Country absent a clear statement otherwise in crafting

235. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518–19 (1832) (holding that the laws of the state
of Georgia had no force in the Cherokee Nation because the U.S. Constitution and treaties gave all
authority over Indian affairs to the federal government); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)
(holding that Arizona courts could not exercise civil jurisdiction over a dispute between a non-Indian
and tribal citizens that rose on the Navajo Nation reservation); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (stating that the Indian Commerce Clause precludes almost all state authority over
Indian affairs); McGirt v. Oklahoma, __U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2478 (2020) (holding that Oklahoma
did not have criminal jurisdiction over Indians in eastern Oklahoma because Congress had never
disestablished the Creek Reservation).
The reiteration of this clear statement rule in multiple sections of the Restatement, see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 5(d) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2021)
(“State laws and regulations conflicting with Indian treaty provisions are invalid, unless authorized
by federal legislation.”); id. § 5(e) (“Indian treaties with States made after 1790 are invalid, unless
authorized by federal legislation.”) suggests that courts should treat it as a “super-strong clear
statement rule[],” which may only be overcome by extremely clear statutory text. ESKRIDGE, ET AL.,
supra note 218, at 651.
236. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 cmt. g (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021) (“The original public understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause was that it vested
Congress with Indian-affairs power to the exclusion of the states.”); see also id. § 7 Reporters’ Notes,
at 120 (“There does not appear to be any state authority remaining in the field of Indian affairs . . . .”);
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. L.J. 113, 149
(2003); Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 234, at 1012.
237. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 7 Reporters’ Notes, at 110–11, 120 (AM.
L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 2021).
238. Id. § 7 cmt. g. Justice Kavanaugh appears to suggest otherwise in Castro-Huerta but aside
from citing to the Tenth Amendment, he provides no support or rationale for the idea that the
Tenth Amendment reserved Indian affairs powers to the states. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, __ U.S.
__, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (2022). Scholars have extensively reviewed the historical documents to show that
the Founders intended for the U.S. Constitution to give exclusive authority over Indian affairs to
Congress. See Clinton, supra note 236, at 149; Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, supra
note 234, at 1012; Savage, supra note 187, at 62.
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its contemporary government-to-government relationship with tribal
governments. Congress has expressly granted some states authority in
Indian Country, most notably under Public Law 280 and some tribe
specific statutes.239 In response to tribal advocacy, Congress has retreated
from this approach in the past fifty years.240 It enacted the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which amended Public Law 280, making it so that
states could not assume criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes without
tribal consent.241 No state has assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280
since then.242 Rather, the frequency with which Congress grants states
authority in Indian Country appears to have decreased in the past fifty
years.243
239. Pub. L. No. 83-280 (1953) (granting five states criminal and civil authority over Indian
Country within their states and authorizing additional states to assume jurisdiction); see also Carole
Goldberg, Tribal Jurisdictional Status Analysis, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribalinstitute.org/lists/tjsa.htm [https://perma.cc/64KD-2ZCU] (listing which states have authority to
exercise jurisdiction in Indian Country).
Scholars, practitioners and tribal leaders have largely condemned Pub. L. 280 as unworkable
because it creates a confusing and underfunded jurisdictional scheme in Indian Country. See Robert
T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian Country Granted by
Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 937–45 (2012); M. Brent Leonard, Returning Washington
P.L. 280 Jurisdiction to Its Original Consent-Based Grounds, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 663, 693–01 (2011–
2012); Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public
Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1635–36 (1998); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits
of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 538, 544–63 (1975). At least
one empirical study has found that Pub. L. 280 does not improve public safety in Indian Country.
Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some
Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 711–26 (2006).
For a discussion of federal statutes recognizing tribal governments and also granting states criminal
or civil authority over tribal lands and communities, see Carlson, supra note 108, at 988–91. Many of
the bills granting jurisdiction to states are not enacted. Id. at 990.
240. PARKER, supra note 70, at 3–5 (noting that tribal advocacy led to the amendments to Pub. L.
280 in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968).
241. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322. It also allowed for state governments to ask Congress to rescind
their authority over Indian affairs. Id. § 1323.
242. Instead, states have sought to retrocede or give back jurisdiction in Indian Country. Anderson,
supra note 239, at 951–56; Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Searching for an Exit: The Indian
Civil Rights Act and Public Law 280, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 247, 247
(Carpenter et al. eds., 2012).
243. Bills introduced in Congress to limit tribal jurisdiction in the past fifty years would have
granted jurisdiction to federal courts rather than state courts. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act
Amendments of 1988, S. 2474, 100th Cong. (granting federal court jurisdiction over claims under the
Indian Civil Rights Act and waiving tribal sovereign immunity in these cases); Indian Civil Rights
Act Amendments of 1989, S. 517, 101st Cong. (1989) (granting federal court jurisdiction over and
waiving tribal sovereign immunity in claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act); Indian Civil Rights
Enforcement Act, S. 2298, 105th Cong. (1998) (extending federal court jurisdiction over and waiving
tribal sovereign immunity in cases brought under the Indian Civil Rights Act); American Indian
Contract Enforcement Act, S. 2299, 105th Cong. (1998) (granting federal district courts’ jurisdiction
over any civil action or claim against an Indian tribe for liquidated or unliquidated damages for cases
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Examples abound of Congress refusing to extend state authority into
Indian Country in recent proposed bills.244 Bills proposing that Congress
grant authority to states are occasionally introduced, but Congress has not
enacted any of them. In contrast, my previous research shows that the
inclusion of grants of state jurisdiction in bills extending federal
recognition to Native Nations has declined in the past fifty years.245
Similarly, Congress rejected proposed bills that would have granted states
the authority to regulate gaming in Indian Country.246 Congress’s refusal
to grant states authority in Indian Country confirms its commitment to this
foundational principle.
***
The Restatement seeks to realign decisional law with statutory law by
directing courts to follow Congress’s lead and return to the foundational
principles of federal Indian law. The foundational principles provide
simple instructions to courts: (1) follow Congress’s lead because the
Constitution gives Congress primary authority over Indian affairs;
(2) defer to Congress when Congress has clearly spoken unless it has
violated the Constitution or the trust relationship and adopt a wait-to-see
approach when Congress is silent or has not spoken clearly and
unequivocally; and (3) deny state authority over Indian affairs unless
Congress has expressly granted specific authority to the state. These
instructions add clarity to federal Indian law and make it easy for judges

not sounding in tort that involved any contract made by a tribe’s governing body or on behalf of a
tribe and waiving tribal immunity as necessary to enforce the Act); American Indian Equal Justice
Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998) (granting jurisdiction over tort actions to state and federal courts
and subjecting tribes to the same liability standards as private individuals or corporations).
244. Carlson, supra note 108, at 990 (discussing how Congress has not enacted most bills granting
jurisdiction to the state); Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background and
Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99, 142–52 (2010) (discussing the multiple proposed bills that
would have allowed the states to regulate Indian gaming).
245. Carlson, supra note 108, at 990.
246. Ducheneaux, supra note 244, at 142–52 (discussing the multiple proposed bills to regulate
Indian gaming). The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act includes states in the tribal gaming compacting
process but does not grant them any authority over tribal gaming. Pub. L. No. 100-497 (1988), 25
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
Some scholars have argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) led to an era of forced
federalism because the Act mandated that tribal governments compact with states to operate class III
gaming operations. JEFF CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER II, FORCED FEDERALISM:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 5 (2008). They argue that the dramatic
increase in intergovernmental agreements or compacts between state and tribal governments after
IGRA indicates a shift towards more state involvement in Indian affairs. Id. at 107–33. IGRA may
have contributed to a change in the state-tribal relationship, but this is not because Congress has
altered the federal-tribal relationship by granting state governments more authority in Indian affairs.
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to apply.247 And as recent congressional history has shown, Congress can
always step back in if things go badly.248
C.

The Restatement Guides Court Interpretations by Clarifying that
Indian Law is Statutory Law

The Restatement reflects the federal-tribal relationship as negotiated by
tribal governments and Congress in the modern era by reiterating the role
of statutory law in federal Indian law and providing guidance to courts
about how to interpret Indian-related statutes. First, the Restatement
guides courts by identifying the relevant statutory texts to be applied in
Indian law cases by area of law. Second, it explicitly instructs courts as to
the canons of statutory construction that apply to federal statutes relating
to American Indians.
1.

What to Interpret: Courts Must Identify the Relevant Statutory
Texts

The Restatement makes clear that federal Indian law is statutory law.249
Statutes are texts to be read, interpreted, and implemented by judges and
agencies. In the statutory context, the legislature is treated as the author
of the text and judges and agencies give meanings to the “legislature’s
policy choices as embodied in the statutory text and structure.”250
The divergence in federal Indian law between statutory law and judgemade law has led judges, courts, and commentators to frequently describe
it as incoherent. This incoherence means that judges often struggle with
the first step in legal interpretation, namely identifying the sources of law
relevant to the issues they have to address.251 Judges have to decide which
247. Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 972 (“Canonical and ancient interpretive rules
adopted and applied by the judiciary itself, such as the canons of construction of Indian treaties and
statutes and the clear statement rules, should make Indian law less complicated for judges.”).
248. See supra section I.B; see also Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 973 (noting
that Congress can step back in and has lots of tools for regulating Indian affairs).
249. See supra section I.A; Carlson, supra note 193, at 115–16, 133–37 (documenting the
disproportionate amount of federal legislation governing Indian tribes and peoples when compared to
federal legislation generally as well as other specialized areas of law over which Congress has
constitutional authority); Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 1026 (“Federal Indian law
is primarily statutory, with hundreds of treaties and thousands of federal statutes and the regulations
that interpret and implement those statutes.”); Deloria, supra note 21, at 207 (describing the 4,300
statutes that Nathan Margold relied on in drafting the 1942 Handbook on Federal Indian Law).
250. Fromer & Silbey, supra note 175, at 355.
251. For example, scholars have extensively criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant,
which relied on several questionable legal sources. Krakoff, supra note 123, at 280–81 (“Essentially,
the Court looked to congressional history, treaties, and statutes and, finding nothing definitive,
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texts are relevant to the issues.252 As Professor Fletcher has argued, the
identification of the relevant text is especially important in federal Indian
law because courts often get it wrong.253 Even when judges get it right,
they do not always follow the text in Indian law cases.254 Further, when
more than one text exists, courts often do not know how to interpret them,
especially if they may conflict.255 Courts cannot give effect to
foundational principles or congressional policy if they cannot identify the
relevant law to apply, which is often federal legislation. The Restatement
addresses these problems by reminding courts that federal Indian law is
statutory law to be interpreted through the lens of the modern federaltribal relationship crafted by Congress and tribal governments. It does this
by clarifying the statutes that are the relevant texts for courts to interpret
in many areas of Indian law.
Section 7 directs courts to follow Congress when it has spoken. The
Restatement’s sections reiterate this directive to courts by identifying the
appropriate, applicable statute to follow.256 These sections often track the
language of the relevant statute, and the comments synthesize the existing
decisional law on them.
Consider some of the sections in chapter 1 on the Federal-Tribal
Relationship as examples. Section 1 defines an Indian by referring to
statutory law.257 It provides a general definition of ‘Indian’ for the
purposes of federal law but then recognizes that the term may be defined

nonetheless concluded that Congress and the Executive Branch have assumed that Indian tribes lack
inherent powers to prosecute non-Indians.”); Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 987–96;
Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 123–24 (“Ultimately, the Court concluded that while
none of the texts were dispositive, the texts collectively evidenced an assumption by all branches of
the federal government, and Indian tribes, too, that tribes never possessed the power to prosecute nonIndians.”). For other critiques of the Oliphant decision, see DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 198–213 (1997); ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 87, 97–115, 139–43 (2005).
252. Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 568 (2017); Fletcher,
Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 119, 135.
253. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 119, 135.
254. Id. at 119 (“[O]ne difficulty with federal Indian law is that too frequently the Court declines
to engage with a relevant text or downplays the significance of the text in favor of a common-lawstyle analysis.”).
255. Id. (“Another difficulty is that the relevant texts may conflict, creating multiple interpretations
that a Scalian textualist would label reasonable, leaving the judges to vote based on their political
views.”).
256. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS §§ 1, 3, 10, 38–45, 61–67 (AM. L. INST.,
Proposed Official Draft 2021).
257. Id. § 1 (“For purposes of federal law, an ‘Indian’ is a member or citizen of a federally
recognized tribe (see § 2(a)), unless that term is defined differently in accordance with a specific
federal statute for the purpose of applying that statute.”).
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differently in specific federal statutes. It explicitly advises courts to follow
federal statutes. Section 3, which defines Indian Country, is even more
explicit in its instruction to courts; it both tracks the statutory language in
18 U.S.C. § 1151 and cites the statute as its source.258 Similarly, section 10
on breach of trust claims follows the statutory language in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1505 and 28 U.S.C. § 1491.259
The Restatement’s emphasis on statutes as the source of federal Indian
law and identification of the relevant statutes courts should apply in Indian
law cases extends beyond the first chapter on federal-tribal relationships.
Examples of other statutes identified as the relevant textual sources of
federal Indian law include, inter alia, the Indian Civil Rights Act
mentioned explicitly in section 16 on the Constitutional Rights of Persons
Under Tribal Jurisdiction;260 the Indian Child Welfare Act referred to
extensively in chapter 3, subchapter 2;261 the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act cited in chapter 4, subchapter 3;262 Public Law 280 referred to in
258. Id. § 3.
259. Id. § 10.
260. Id. § 16 (“The primary sources of law constraining tribal government authority with respect
to the rights of individuals under tribal jurisdiction are tribal law and the Indian Civil Rights Act.
Absent a federal statute authorizing enforcement of federal law against tribal authority, tribal law
governs or constrains the exercise of tribal governmental authority. The federal constitutional
constraints on governmental authority set forth in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
do not apply to or constrain tribal governments.”).
261. Id. §§ 38–45. More specifically, section 38 reiterates the statutory language in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1903, section 42 tracks the language in 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c), and section 43 relies on 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(a), 25 U.S.C. § 1918-1919, and 25 C.F.R. § 23.110.
The references to these statutes demonstrate how the Restatement attempts to redirect courts so that
they act more in line with the modern federal-tribal relationship. Many of these statutes are the product
of the relationship renegotiated between Congress and tribal governments. The Indian Child Welfare
Act is a prime example of how tribal governments renegotiated their relationship with Congress.
Advocacy by tribal governments and the Association of American Indian Affairs led to the enactment
of the Indian Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., Claire Palmiste, From the Indian Adoption Project to the
Indian Child Welfare Act: The Resistance of Native American Communities, 22 INDIGENOUS POL’Y
J. 1 (2011), http://indigenouspolicy.org/index.php/ipj/issue/view/10 [https://perma.cc/986N-F45C]
(examining the social and political context leading to the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act);
Christie Renick, The Nation’s First Family Separation Policy, THE IMPRINT YOUTH AND FAM. NEWS
(Oct. 9, 2018, 05:05 AM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/nations-first-family-separationpolicy-indian-child-welfare-act/32431 [https://perma.cc/N9NC-JYK2] (documenting the role of
Bertram Hirsch and the Association of the American Indian in the movement to enact the Indian Child
Welfare Act); PARKER, supra note 70, at 39–44 (recounting the development of the Indian Child
Welfare Act).
262. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS §§ 61, 63–66 (AM. L. INST., Proposed
Official Draft 2021) (Section 61, titled “Indian Lands,” refers to 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4); section 63,
titled “Class II Gaming,” refers to 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(7), 2710; section 64, titled “Class III Gaming,”
refers to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d); section 65, titled “Management Contracts,” refers to 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2710(d)(9), 2711; and section 66, titled “After-Acquired Lands,” refers to 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)–
(b)). Other sections refer to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as well. See, e.g., id. § 60, “Federal
Approval of Contracts with Indian Tribes” (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 81, 85, 177, 392, 396(a), 415, 2102).
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section 34; and the Major Crimes Act, Indian Country Crimes Act, and
the Assimilative Crimes Act relied on in chapter 5 on Indian Country
Criminal Jurisdiction.263
The heavy reliance on statutes in multiple sections in the Restatement
shows the primacy of statutory language as a source of federal Indian law
and directs courts to follow that language. By identifying the relevant
statutory provisions, the Restatement realigns federal Indian law with
foundational Indian law principles and congressional policy and addresses
one of the major criticisms of federal Indian law decisions, namely that
courts selectively choose the texts they interpret and that these choices
lead to the results the judges want. Thus, to borrow from Professor
Fletcher, what the Restatement seeks to do is draw the interpreter’s gaze
to the relevant text.264
2.

Courts Must Interpret Federal Indian Statutes Through the Lens of
the Modern Federal-Tribal Relationship

The Restatement does more than identify the relevant statutory laws for
courts to interpret. It also guides courts on how to interpret those statutes.
Sections 8 and 9 instruct courts to adhere to foundational principles of
federal Indian law by viewing legislation through the lens of the modern
federal-tribal relationship negotiated by tribal governments and Congress.
Thus, it directs courts to interpret statutes consistently with the modern
federal-tribal relationship and Congress’s views on it.265
Section 8 clarifies the canon of construction to be applied to Indian
affairs statutes.266 It states, “[f]ederal legislation addressing Indian affairs
must be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.”267 The
directive to construe statutory language liberally ensures that courts
recognize the trust relationship at the heart of the modern federal-tribal
relationship. Comment a makes this point explicitly when it states,
263. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS §§ 68–70 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021) (“Indian Country,” “Indian Status,” and “Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian
Country,” respectively).
264. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 145 (“But what texts matters most is dependent
on what draws the interpreter’s gaze.”).
265. I am not arguing that the Restatement suggests that courts follow a particular theory of
statutory interpretation in federal Indian law cases. Professor Fletcher cogently argues that courts can
craft a textualist theory of statutory interpretation that will reflect foundational principles of federal
Indian law and congressional policy. See Fletcher, Muskrat Textualism, supra note 26, at 999–1011.
266. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 8 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft
2021).
267. Id. For a discussion of how courts have applied this canon, see Skibine, supra note 121, at 3–
4, 15–21.
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“[s]ince Congress legislates in Indian affairs from the position of its trust
relationship with Indian tribes and individual Indians, courts assume that
Congress intends its enactments to benefit tribal and individual Indian
interests.”268 Comment a recognizes that federal legislation related to
Indians differs from other kinds of federal legislation and, thus, merits
distinct treatment by courts. As section I.A shows, Congress enacts
Indian-related legislation to fulfill its trust obligations to tribes, including
its duty to protect tribal governance and homelands, and seeks tribal
participation in crafting these laws.269 Most other legislation does not
either govern a relationship or emerge out of negotiations between two
sovereigns.270 The interpretation of Indian-related statutes should reflect
these differences, which is why the Restatement directs courts to apply
the canon rather than ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.271
Section 8 further reflects the modern federal-tribal relationship in
guiding courts to construe language liberally and to the benefit of Indians
and Indian tribes. Through this language, section 8 opens the door for
courts to take tribal perspectives into account when interpreting federal
statutes applicable to them.272 Such advice might seem questionable in
other contexts,273 but it is consistent with a modern federal-tribal
relationship premised on maximum tribal participation in federal
268. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 8 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021).
269. See supra section I.A.
270. The exception would be statutes dealing with intergovernmental affairs. Like other
intergovernmental lobbies, tribal governments and pan-tribal organizations often seek
“jurisdictionally based benefits from the federal government.” John P. Pelissero & Robert E. England,
State and Local Government’s Washington “Reps”—Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan’s
New Federalism, 19 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 68, 69 (1987).
271. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 8 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021) (“Ordinary rules of statutory interpretation do not apply, and courts interpret ambiguous
provisions in federal statutes to the benefit of the Indians.”).
272. For a similar argument, see Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 26, at 139 (arguing that
courts like Congress should take tribal perspectives into account).
273. Political commentators and the media often represent organized interests as having undue
political influence. This commentary reflects concerns about bias within interest group mobilization
and how it may skew the lawmaking process. See generally MATT GROSSMANN, THE NOT-SOSPECIAL INTERESTS: INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC REPRESENTATION, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE
(2012); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. KIMBALL, &
BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009). These
concerns raise questions about what role the perspectives of organized interests should play in the
lawmaking process and how much deference courts should give to their views. ESKRIDGE, ET AL.,
supra note 219, at 751 (noting skepticism that committee reports could be tainted by lobbyists and
lawyers maneuvering to persuade congressional staffers to include language helpful to their clients in
the report). These concerns, however, may be misplaced when it comes to Native peoples, who have
a distinct governmental relationship with the United States and have often been excluded from
lawmaking processes.
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lawmaking. It also reflects current congressional practice and policy,
which encourages lawmaking with rather than for tribes.274
Section 9 builds on section 8 and gives further instructions to courts
about interpreting statutes in federal Indian law.275 It is not stated as a
canon of statutory construction, but it provides courts with guidance about
how to interpret statutes enacted in accord with the trust responsibility.
Section 9 instructs courts to give deference to statutes enacted under the
trust responsibility because they are based on the federal government’s
longstanding political relationship with tribal governments and their
citizens rather than a racial classification of Indians.276
This instruction in section 9 further reflects the modern federal-tribal
relationship, which is built on a congressional commitment to
acknowledge tribal sovereignty and uphold the trust relationship. Tribal
sovereignty, including the recognition of tribes as separate sovereign
governments by the federal government, distinguishes Indians from other
274. See supra section I.A. The canons of statutory construction in section 8 are also consistent
with the view that state and local governments should and do have more access to federal lawmakers
and a distinct role in federal lawmaking when compared to other organized interests. See Pelissero &
England, supra note 270, at 69; ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 126 (1995).
275. RESTATEMENT OF THE L.: THE L. OF AM. INDIANS § 9(a) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official
Draft 2021) (“If tied rationally to the fulfillment of the United States’ trust relationship with Indians
and Indian tribes, see § 4, federal laws that treat Indians or Indian tribes differently from other
individuals or groups create political, not racial, classifications and are not subject to strict scrutiny
under the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”).
Interestingly, sections 8 and 9 define the legislation they apply to differently. Section 8 mentions
“[f]ederal legislation addressing Indian affairs,” id. § 8, while section 9 applies to statutes “tied
rationally to the fulfillment of the United States’ trust relationship with Indians and Indian tribes,” id.
§ 9. Neither the comments nor the reporters’ notes appear to explain the difference in terms or whether
this difference in language is meant to distinguish the applicability of the two sections. Reading both
sections through the lens of the modern federal-tribal relationship suggests that both should be read
broadly by courts to apply whenever interpreting a federal statute in relation to American Indians and
Alaska Natives.
276. An extensive literature exists on categorizing American Indians politically, racially, or both.
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CAL. L. REV. 495 (2020);
Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes:” Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional
Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025 (2018); Sarah Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian
Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017); Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 295 (2011); Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2012); Addie Rolnick, The
Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011);
Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591 (2009); Carol
Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential Treatment”, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2001); David C.
Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759
(1991); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, What’s an Indian? A Conversation about Law School
Admissions, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Affirmative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1107 (1991); Carol
Goldberg-Ambrose, Not Strictly Racial: A Response to Indians as Peoples, 39 UCLA L. REV. 169
(1991).
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groups in the United States.277 Congress has repeatedly acknowledged this
in federal statutes and in its practice of inviting tribal governmental
participation in lawmaking.278 Section 9 directs courts to follow the
modern federal-tribal relationship in the way that it frames the appropriate
question for courts to consider in interpreting these statutes. The question
for courts to ask in reviewing legislation is: Is the legislation enacted in
furtherance of the trust relationship between the United States and tribal
governments? This framing of the inquiry reflects the modern federaltribal relationship. Courts should defer to Congress as the lead institution
in Indian affairs and base their decisions on how Congress has negotiated
its government-to-government relationship with Native Nations.
CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, federal Indian law has developed along two
divergent paths. In response to tribal advocacy, Congress renewed its
government-to-government relationship with tribal governments,
acknowledging inherent tribal sovereignty and the United States’ trust
obligations to Native peoples. As a result, Congress has engaged tribal
governments in the lawmaking process. Together they have crafted a
network of statutes based on foundational principles of Indian law and
reflective of tribal governments’ growing capacities to serve their
communities. In contrast, courts have departed from foundational
principles of Indian law and congressional policy, often to the detriment
of the modern federal-tribal relationship committed to by both tribal
governments and Congress.
The Restatement of the Law of American Indians provides an
opportunity to reconcile these two conflicting visions of Indian law. It
relies on how tribal governments and Congress have reworked the federaltribal relationship, congressional policy, and statutory law to restate
federal Indian law. In short, it brings two major players in the creation of
federal Indian law—Congress and tribal governments—back into the
picture and reiterates for courts the central role that they play in making
federal Indian law. The Restatement directs courts to follow foundational
principles and congressional policy. As a result, it provides courts with a
vision of federal Indian law that is more coherent, easier to apply, and
more reflective of the state of affairs in Indian Country than the decisional
law adopted by the Supreme Court in the past fifty years.

277. See VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO (1969).
278. See supra section I.A.

